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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (25 Jul 68 FOR OT RD 682179

14 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th  
SFG, 1st Special Forces, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)  
This report contains information affecting the National  
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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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**5th SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)**

**1ST SPECIAL FORCES**



OPERATIONAL REPORT  
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD  
ENDING 30 APR 68

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## INCLOSURES

1. Organizational Data (Troop Disposition List, CTZ Maps and Organizational Structure Chart)
2. Statistical Data
- \* ~~3. Visitors Briefing~~
4. Development of the CIDG Program, 1964 - 1968
- \*\* ~~5. After Action Report Battle of Lang Vei~~
- \*\* ~~6. Chronological Listing of Enemy Activity and Contacts from 1 Jan to 6 Feb 68~~
- \*\* ~~7. Camp Lang Vei Schematic~~
- \*\* ~~8. General Narrative of Events~~
- \* ~~9. The Green Beret Magazine~~
- \* ~~10. Monthly Operational Summaries for the Months of Feb, Mar and Apr 68~~

\* Withdrawn, Hqs DA

\*\* Withdrawn, Hqs DA, Published Separately as Combat After Action Report Lang Vei

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO San Francisco 96240

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15 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period  
Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65(RI) (U)

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam,  
ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO San Francisco 96375  
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific  
APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D. C., 20310

1. (S) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a(5) General. At the beginning of the reporting period, large scale enemy attacks on major installations and cities were still in progress throughout the Republic of Vietnam. As a result of the Tet offensive, Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) forces assumed new missions, construction projects in progress were delayed, new construction was necessitated, plans to relocate open, close, and convert camps were deferred or cancelled and thousands of refugees were assisted. A more detailed summary CIDG activities during the Tet offensive is given in paragraph 1c(6) of this report. However, the most significant single action during the quarter occurred at Special Forces camp Lang Vei, (See inclosures 5, 6, 7, and 8). The large scale attack that had been expected occurred on 7 February when a combined armor and infantry attack overran the camp. The attack marked the first tactical utilization of tanks by the enemy in South Vietnam.

(1) Operations. Largely, as a result of the Tet offensive, operations and results increased during the quarter as compared to the previous period. A total of 4,408 company size operations were conducted during the quarter. A total of 2492 enemy were killed as compared to 2041 killed during the previous reporting period and the number captured increased from 228 to 457. Although operations and enemy casualties increased, the number of USASF killed experienced a significant decrease from 37 to 17. CIDG casualties remained approximately the same. The statistical data found at inclosure 2

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offers complete information on the operations conducted and the results  
obtained during the quarter.

(2) Changes in Status of CIDG Camps.

(a) The Special Forces camp at Lang Vei was closed on 7 February as a  
result of being overrun. Detachment B-44 on Phuoc Quoc Island was closed  
on 20 March.

(b) The camp on Phuoc Duoc Island (A-441) which formerly contained the  
IV CTZ Training Center, commenced to convert to RF following the relocation of  
the training center to To Chau on 18 March. The conversion is expected to be  
completed on 15 June 1968.

(c) Two CIDG camps were opened during the reporting period, Katum (A-322)  
on 21 February, and Thanh Tri (A-414) on 15 March. The assets from Prek Klok  
were redeployed to Katum and the assets from Moc Hoa were redeployed to  
Thanh Tri.

(3) Training. As a result of the armor attack on Lang Vei, special  
emphasis was placed on training the CIDG in the utilization of anti-tank  
weapons. The recent increased emphasis on training activities is reflected  
by the appearance of separate articles on the Recoado School and the VNSF  
Training Center in the April issue of the Green Beret Magazine (See inclosure 9).

(4) A Special Report, the Development of the CIDG Program, 1964 - 1968 (U)  
was prepared during the quarter and is contained at inclosure 4.

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## b. (S) Intelligence.

(1) As a direct result of tactical operations and population control within Nha Trang city, the G-2 Section, VNSF, became overcrowded with both prisoners and detainees during the first two days of the Tet offensive in January and February 1968. Detention facilities were not available at either VNSF or USASF areas; Khanh Hoa Sector Headquarters, where prisoners are normally transferred, had ceased operation; most police, intelligence and support activities other than USASF, VNSF and the RVN National Police were functioning marginally or had ceased operation and proper interrogations were impossible to conduct in the overcrowded VNSF Headquarters. USASF Counterintelligence personnel obtained the Provincial Interrogation Center for the incarceration of the prisoners, funding support from MACCORDS for the Center's added logistical needs, and additional interrogators from the 55th MID, MACCORDS and CI Branch assets. The removal of the prisoners and detainees from the G-2 Section, VNSF allowed that section to return to normal operations, allowed first priority access to key prisoners by USASF and VNSF, and provided expeditious interrogation by using numerous teams from the various agencies. Preliminary Interrogation Reports were made immediately available to USASF, VNSF and RVN National Police. The transfer would have not been possible without the complete cooperation and assistance of the Khanh Hoa Province ICEX Committee Chairman, who has stated that the transfer was instrumental in enabling the National Police to apprehend numerous terrorist and infrastructure personalities during this period.

(2) In cooperation with the newly created Special Operations Section of the G-2, VNSF, the CI Branch has initiated bilateral operations against the local VC infrastructure, Khanh Hoa Province. To date, the VNSF have been able to recruit two infrastructure members. An adequate number of agent personnel have been recruited to initiate an early warning system around Nha Trang city as soon as communications equipment can be procured.

## (3) Project Gamma.

(a) The control element for Project Gamma, previously referred to as Detachment B-57, relocated from Saigon to the SFOB in Nha Trang on 28 February. The change in unit designation was effective on 1 April. The unit's mission to act as a collection element in support of Project Nantucket remained unchanged.

(b) Project Gamma presently operates with 18 personnel from camps Duc Co and Duc Lap in II CTZ, Bu Dop, Loc Ninh, Thien Ngan, Tay Ninh and Duc Hue, in III CTZ, Moc Hoa, and Chau Doc in IV CTZ.

(c) Because of an acute shortage of personnel which is expected to become critical by June, operations by Project Gamma are scheduled to be terminated at Thien Ngan, Duc Hue, and Moc Hoa. The personnel assets from these sites will be transferred to Duc Co, Duc Lap, and Loc Ninh.

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## (4)(c) Summary of Enemy Activity by Corps Tactical Zone.

(a) I CTZ. At the end of the last reporting period, approximately 20,000 enemy troops were massed in NW Quang Tri Province and large scale attacks against Special Forces Camp Lang Vei, Detachment A-101, and the Khe Sanh combat base were anticipated at any time. The anticipated attack became a reality on 7 February when camp Lang Vei was overrun by a ground attack spearheaded by approximately 12 tanks, some of which were identified as Soviet PT-76 amphibious models. At the close of the Tet offensive, enemy units withdrew into normally secure areas to regroup, resupply, and receive replacements. The enemy increased efforts to improve and construct new lines of communications in the Ashau Valley and south of Special Forces camp Kham Duc, Detachment A-105. Over these routes the enemy introduced a significant amount of sophisticated weapons and equipment into I CTZ. During this period of replenishing his forces, the enemy attempted to avoid contact with friendly units. Enemy activity in Special Forces TAOR's consisted of unit movement along infiltration routes; however, very few large units remained within the TAOR's for any long periods of time. By early April, only an estimated four combat effective enemy battalions remained in the vicinity of Khe Sanh as the majority of the 325C and 304th NVA Divisions withdrew into Laos in front of the sweep operation conducted by elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division. By the end of April, as a result of the buildup of enemy forces near FVMAF key installations, indications were that another general offensive was soon to be launched. Taxation of the local populace for rice increased and there was a rise in propaganda incidents directed against GVN controlled areas, ARVN military families and Special Forces camps. The presence of the 31st NVA Regiment near Thuong Duc (A-109), the 2nd NVA Division command post and the 3rd Regiment, 2nd NVA Division near Kham Duc (A-105), and the 1st (and possibly the 21st) NVA regiments near Tien Phuoc (A-102) posed serious threats to the three camps as the quarter ended.

(b) II CTZ. During the Tet offensive, the enemy concentrated his combat units around the provincial capitals and population centers of II CTZ. Whenever possible, the enemy employed local force and main force units as the initial entry element; major NVA units were used as reinforcing and blocking elements and in many cases did not engage in offensive activity. During this offensive, the enemy made a serious error in judgment in expecting the civilian population to rally to the cause of the VC. In almost every city in which VC/NVA gained temporary control, civilian support was almost non-existent, and in all cases the enemy suffered heavy losses. Enemy activity around Special Forces camps during the Tet offensive was at a minimum. This enabled many camp strike force units to be released for clearing operations in the cities. Camp Strike Force and Mobile Strike Force units were deployed to the provincial capitals of Kontum, Pleiku, Ban Me Thuot, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Dalat and Phan Thiet. Despite the fact that none of these troops had received training in house-to-house fighting, the CIDG performed in an outstanding manner. Following the Tet offensive, enemy units employed attacks by fire in order to effect an orderly withdrawal. For the most part, local force and main force VC units suffered the heaviest losses in personnel while NVA units suffered heavy losses

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in supplies and material. In the western highlands, the enemy concentrated his efforts on logistics and construction. Reports of road building began to increase and by late March it was apparent that the enemy was capable of deploying along an NVA road network that extended out of the tri-border area as far east as camp Polei Kleng and as far south as the lower Plei Trap Valley. From early February to mid March, SF camp Ben Het was the target of almost continuous mortar and rocket attacks, however, construction of the new SF camp continued and by late March enemy units began to withdraw from the area. The enemy attempted to isolate the major population centers of western II CTZ by encircling the cities and interdicting lines of communication. Attacks by fire became a standard tactic with the probable objective of strangulating the economy in the urban areas and thereby raising prices and disaffecting the population from the GVN. The enemy's continued presence around population centers, however, made his base camps vulnerable to friendly airstrikes and sweep operations. By late March, most major NVA units were forced to withdraw to more secure base areas. Enemy units in the coastal provinces suffered heavy losses during the Tet offensive. Infiltration of personnel and supplies to these units continued with high priority going to elements of the NT-3 NVA Division. By late April main force and local force units were back up to pre-Tet strength levels. Following the Tet offensive, there was a major reorganization of the B-3 front as evidenced by the movement of the 32nd NVA regiment into Darlac Province, the infiltration of a new regiment into the western highlands, and numerous reports of change of command in other NVA units. At the present time, all NVA units continue to avoid major contact while regrouping and resupplying for a possible second offensive in II CTZ. At the end of the reporting period, SF camps Ben Het, Dak To, Dak Pek, Polei Kleng, and Duc Lap were under threat of attacks varying in intensity from harassment attacks by fire to large scale attacks by multi-regiment enemy forces.

(c) III CTZ. At the close of the Tet offensive enemy units were concentrated in the central areas of the Corps and away from the SF camps which are located along the border. The enemy forces sustained heavy casualties during and immediately following Tet when allied units began conducting extensive sweep operations. The VC/NVA withdrew to locations north of the capital military district and avoided all possible contact in attempts to regroup and refit his units. The failure of the Vietnamese populace to come to the aid of the Viet Cong forced the enemy to rely upon the infiltration of supplies and personnel. Enemy forces then followed a policy of trying to isolate allied base camps and CIDG camps by intensifying the numbers of attacks by fire. They introduced the 107mm rocket in addition to the 122mm and 140mm rockets already in use. For a limited period of time, this tactic was partially effective in that it inflicted casualties upon allied forces with little risk of enemy losses. On 26 February an operation from Ben Soi, A-321, established contact near the Cambodian border with an estimated enemy battalion which was accompanied by three T-34 tanks and a possible quad-50 mounted on a half track. The SF element disabled one tank with a M-72 LAW. Along the northern border, SF camps came under repeated artillery fire as the enemy stepped up resupply and replacement operations. Enemy forces were infiltrated

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in vast numbers through the Bu Gai Map region of Phuoc Long Province, northeastern War Zone C of Tay Ninh Province, and from Ba Thu in Cambodia through Hau Nghia Province. HQ IIFV reported that in the two months immediately following Tet, 5500 enemy personnel infiltrated into III CTZ - a considerable increase over the previous 1500 per month. In areas between Bu Dop, A-341, and Loc Ninh, A-331, SF operations contacted NVA forces using vehicles along recently constructed roads. To the east of Song Be, B-34, a well traveled enemy road, which ran south from the Cambodian border to the vicinity of GVN Highway 14, was discovered. Free world forces ran extensive reconnaissance missions in the area to direct airstrikes and artillery on enemy base camps and avenues of approach. Results were such that the enemy was temporarily impeded in his efforts to supply units in central III CTZ. At the present time the enemy is confirmed as having somewhat less than 50,000 troops in III CTZ, to include administrative personnel. The majority of enemy units are understrength, rated marginally to non-combat effective. With the equivalent of less than 20 fully combat effective maneuver battalions, the enemy is not considered capable of launching any major Corps-wide offensive; he is quite capable, however, of concentrating a number of forces in one area for the purpose of targeting a specific objective, such as Bien Hoa - Long Binh complex. SF camps located in proximity to enemy infiltration routes are expected to be subjected to continuing attacks by fire while supplies and personnel are transported through the area. The disposition of the 9th VC Division and its subordinate regiments north of the Michelin Plantation threaten the security of Camp Minh Thanh A-322, although it is believed that the enemy units here are extremely weak and will attempt to avoid all possible contact with allied forces. Build-ups of unidentified personnel and increasing terrorist and propaganda activities in northern Binh Long Province pose a possible, but improbable, threat to Hon Quan, B-33, and Loc Ninh, A-331. Reported plans for future attacks on district and provincial capitals in western III CTZ probably also include diversionary attacks on Duc Hoa, B-35, and its two subordinate A detachments. In other areas the enemy can be expected to continue with occasional small scale attacks and/or probes in addition to repeated attacks by fire, utilizing recoilless rifles, mortars, RPGs, and rockets to inflict as much damage as possible without the risk of losing troops in contact with SF elements.

(d) IV CTZ. During the Tet offensive, which began on 30 January and extended into February, coordinated enemy attacks were launched against province and district capitals and other heavily populated areas. Cities in which Special Forces camps are located and which came under heavy fire and ground attacks during the Tet offensive include Chau Doc (Detachment B-42), Cao Lanh (Detachment B-43), Moc Hoa (Detachment B-41), and Can Tho (Detachment C-4). In Dinh Tuong Province the enemy continued to maintain the equivalent of four combat effective battalions. Special Forces camps My Phuoc Tay, A-411, and My Dien II, A-416, were further threatened by the introduction of the 120mm mortar by the 263rd main force battalion. Friendly operations conducted in the province were probably responsible for the lack of enemy activity against the SF camps. These operations were continually successful in inflicting

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heavy casualties on the enemy and in discovering of large enemy weapons cache sites. The largest confirmed enemy unit in Kien Tuong Province continues to be the 504th local force battalion which operates generally in the Moc Hoa, Detachment B-41, area. Unconfirmed reports indicate the possible existence of one battalion northwest of Moc Hoa near the Cambodian border and another battalion southeast of Kinh Quan II, A-412. Although unconfirmed, their possible presence poses an additional threat to these Special Forces camps. Cao Lanh, B-43, continues to be threatened by the 502nd battalion; however, several unconfirmed reports of the 502nd battalion in the area indicates an increased threat of an enemy offensive against Cao Lanh. The 512th local force battalion is reported to be operating near the Chau Doc Province/Cambodian border area. Reports received during the Tet offensive indicated the presence of a 510th and 511th battalion in the Chau Doc area. The recent movement of the Dong II regiment and its subordinate elements, the 303rd and the 309th main force battalion, from Choung Thien Province into Phong Dinh Province has increased the threat of attack against Can Tho. The 307th battalion, which reportedly participated in attacks against Can Tho city during Tet, and the Tay Do local force battalion continues to operate in the province. The enemy in Phong Dinh Province also recently acquired a 120 mm mortar capability, thus increasing this offensive capabilities even more. Enemy forces throughout the IV CTZ are currently recruiting, training, and resupplying their forces, possibly in preparation for a second general offensive expected to take place in the near future.

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## c. Summary of Significant Operations.

(1) CI CTZ. Tet offensive activities for the most part had little effect on CIDG and RF/PF operations in I CTZ. The most significant event during the reporting period was the loss of camp Lang Vei. On 7 February at approximately 0030 hours, the camp came under attack by NVA tanks and infantry. Camp Lang Vei was overrun by approximately 0415 hours. Late that afternoon, all of the USASF survivors broke out of an underground bunker and made their way to old camp Lang Vei. Inclosures 5, 6, 7, and 8 discuss the battle of Lang Vei in detail. Special Forces camps throughout the I Corps Tactical Zone have completed a training program on the use of anti-tank weapons available at their camp site. Personnel assets from Lang Vei were transferred to the camp Thuong Duc, A-109, FOB on hill 52. A total of 348 company size operations and 868 platoon size operations were conducted by units subordinate to Company G.

(a) February. During the month of February, 94 company size operations and 269 platoon size operations were conducted. Enemy losses during the month were 13 CIDG, 11 RF/PF and three USASF killed. Seventy-five CIDG, 11 RF/PF, three VNSF, and 19 USASF were wounded. Summaries of significant action during February follow.

On 1 February, the Ba To District Headquarters came under attack by an estimated 700 VC, some of which were armed with automatic weapons, recoilless rifles, 60 mm mortars, and M-79 grenade launchers. Approximately one half of the enemy were armed with spears and knives. The enemy breached the perimeter and used C-4 composition to destroy the Province Headquarters and several bunkers. Results of this attack were 12 VC killed, six RF/PF killed, seven RF/PF wounded, four M-1 rifles lost, and the village chief of Ba Hiep killed. Later that day at 0600 hours a RF/PF patrol made contact with an estimated VC company. The VC were armed with spears, knives, and small arms. The enemy began to withdraw north when mortar fire was adjusted upon their positions. Ten VC were killed and several knives and spears were captured. At 0650 hours, a VC company was seen moving across the Ba To air strip. In front of them they were pushing Montagnards who were armed with spears and knives. A CSF reaction force engaged the enemy and captured six VC, 20 spears, 35 knives, and one carbine. Friendly losses were two CSF soldiers killed and two weapons lost.

On 13 February, the Ba To District Headquarters and camp Ba To, A-106, were probed by one VC main force company. The VC attacked and overran a district outpost. Camp Ba To fired illumination and HE in support of the outpost. The VC then withdrew and proceeded southeast. The results of the action were two PF soldiers killed, 16 PF soldiers and 19 weapons missing.

On 23 February, a reconnaissance in force operation from Ba To, A-106, made contact with one VC platoon from a distance of 200 meters. Results of the encounter were 10 VC killed and 30 military structures destroyed.

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A reconnaissance operation from camp Thong Duc, A-109, made contact with 12 VC from a distance of 200 meters on 23 February. After a brief fire fight, the VC broke contact and withdrew in an unknown direction. Two CSF soldiers were wounded. Five VC were killed and two small arms were captured.

A motor convoy left Company C, Danang, on 25 February at 1100 hours enroute to camp Thuong Duc, A-109. At 1340 hours the convoy was ambushed by an estimated company of VC. Reaction forces from camp Thuong Duc and a US Marine unit proceeded to the ambush site where contact was made and the enemy was forced to withdraw. Results of the ambush were one USASF, 13 CIDG, and one ARVN soldier killed. There were nine USASF, one VMSF, and eight CIDG soldiers wounded. Three 2½ ton trucks were destroyed. Fifteen of the enemy were killed and 11 were wounded. Seven small arms, two crew served weapons, and 30 chicom grenades were captured.

(b) March. During the month of March 139 company size operations and 238 platoon size operations were conducted. Enemy losses during the month were 72 VC killed, 18 wounded, and 23 captured. Friendly losses were seven CIDG, four RF/PF, and two USASF personnel killed. Fifty CIDG, five RF/PF, and three USASF were wounded. Summaries of significant actions during March follow.

On 8 March, an operation from camp Gia Vuc, A-103, executed a surprise raid on a group of VC gathered in a local village. The raid resulted in seven VC killed, seven rucksack with medical supplies captured, and 18 structures destroyed.

On 12 March, a motor convoy was returning to camp Thuong Duc, A-109, from the FOB on hill #52 located eight kilometers east of camp Thuong Duc when it was ambushed by an estimated platoon of VC. A helicopter from Company C received small arms fire as it was attempting to assist the convoy and two USASF were wounded. Other friendly losses were one USASF killed, four CSF soldiers wounded and three weapons lost. Reaction forces from camp Thuong Duc were dispatched but could not establish further contact with the enemy.

Again on 19 March at 1545 hours, a seven truck convoy, which was moving along route #4 from camp Thuong Duc to Danang, was ambushed by an unknown size VC force. The enemy used command detonated mines. Results of the ambush were one CSF soldier killed and two MSF soldiers wounded. One 2½ ton truck was destroyed and another suffered 25% damage. Enemy losses were three VC killed and one wounded. The convoy closed into Danang at 1900 hours without further contact.

On 27 March at 0345 hours, an outpost located two kilometers east of camp Tien Phuoc, A-102 was attacked and overrun by two platoon of VC. A reaction force from camp Thien Phuoc was dispatched to the outpost, but no further contact was established. One USASF, one US Engineer, one CSF, and three PF soldiers were killed. Enemy losses are unknown.

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(c) April. During the month of April, 116 company size operations and 361 platoon size operations were conducted. Enemy losses during the month of April were 63 VC killed, 24 wounded, and six captured. Friendly losses were eight CIDG killed, 30 CIDG, and five USASF personnel wounded. Two CIDG were missing in action. There were very few significant contacts during the month of April.

On 10 April, one USASF and five MSF soldiers from Sa Huynh FOB, Quang Ngai Province, triggered a pressure type mine which was a signal for ambush by an unknown size VC force. Two of the MSF soldiers were killed. The USASF and the other three MSF soldiers were wounded. Three M-16 rifles were lost and the 2½ ton truck in which the personnel were riding was destroyed. There was one VC suspect detained.

On 12 April, a company size reconnaissance in force operation from camp Ha Thanh, A-104 was ambushed by a VC squad from a distance of 15 meters. There were two CSF soldiers killed and 10 wounded.

On 13 April, an operation from Tien Phuoc, A-102, while conducting a bomb damage assessment, discovered 19 VC killed by air and a large cache nine kilometers southeast of camp Tien Phuoc. The cache contained 20 picks, 950 chicom grenades, 40 homemade grenades, 20 fragmentation rifle grenades, 50 US anti-tank rifle grenade, 47 RPG-7 rockets, two 57 mm recoilless rifle rounds, eight 75 mm recoilless rifle rounds, 7,705 rounds of 12.7 mm ammunition, 22,000 rounds of 7.62 link ammunition, 23,000 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition, 228 60 mm mortar rounds, 17 120 mm mortar rounds, 285 82 mm mortar rounds, 139 pounds of explosives, 18 small arms, four RPG-2 rocket launchers, one 82 mm mortar tube and base plate, and 20 sights for 60 mm mortars.

On 28 April, a platoon size operation from camp Ha Thanh, A-104, was fired upon by an estimated platoon of VC from a village at a distance of 50 meters. There were seven VC killed; seven military structures and one ton of rice were destroyed. Three USASF advisors were wounded.

(2Xc)II CTZ. During the early part of the reporting period (the Tet offensive), operations conducted by MSF and CSF units within major populated areas were highly successful. These forces proved to be flexible, responsive, and effective when utilized in the role of quick reaction light infantry. It should be emphasized, however, that these forces are not suited for employment in sustained operations without support augmentation. All detachments in II CTZ completed a training program on the utilization of anti-tank weapons. A total of 875 company size operations and 2137 platoon size operations were conducted during the reporting period. The authorization of one MSF company per subordinate B detachment has enhanced reaction to intelligence within the B detachment areas. The MSF company at Ban Me Thuot, B-23, has already been employed into contact areas on four reinforcement/reaction missions. The reporting period has seen an increase in the number of operations conducted in which MSF companies were placed under the operational control of conventional

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US units. In most cases, the problems that were encountered were due mainly to the conventional commander's lack of understanding of the problems surrounding the employment of indigenous troops. To some extent, this problem is alleviated by placing a liaison officer at the conventional unit headquarters. It was found during the quarter that MSF multi-company operations utilizing LRP assets are highly desirable as a part of MSF operations. Several of these operations were conducted during the reporting period under the control of a MSF command element.

(a) February. During the month of February, 305 company size operations and 790 platoon size operations were conducted. Enemy losses during the month were 492 VC killed, 25 wounded, and 29 captured. Friendly losses were 45 CIDG, two VNSF, and four USASF personnel killed. There were 220 CIDG, two RF/PF two VNSF, and 44 USASF personnel wounded during the month and one USASF was reported missing in action. Significant actions are discussed in the summaries that follow.

During the period 30 January to 6 February, Detachment B-23 and other allied forces were involved in the defense of the city of Ban Me Thuot. Combined NVA and VC forces conducted attacks by mortars, rockets, and ground assaults. On four principal objectives, Darlac Sector Headquarters, 23rd Division Tactical Operations Center, National Police Headquarters, and the province bank. A total of forty-nine secondary targets were attacked. The enemy destroyed approximately one third of Ban Me Thuot city. Friendly losses sustained by Special Forces Detachment B-23 were one USASF and one CIDG wounded. Less than 1% damage was suffered by the B-23 compound. Combined enemy losses due to all allied forces were 994 killed and 117 wounded.

On 30 January at 0820 hours an operation which consisted of one MSF company from Company B Pleiku, deployed in the city of Pleiku and initiated contact with an unknown size enemy unit. At 0945 hours another MSF company was inserted into the battle. Heavy resistance was encountered, and "street" fighting continued the remainder of the day. Two additional MSF companies and two platoons of MSF soldiers entered into the battle before the day ended. Enemy activity was quiet during the night and MSF elements maintained a cordon around the city. The fighting continued the next day. By 5 February, the city of Pleiku was secure. Results were 57 NVA killed and 15 NVA captured. Friendly losses were one USASF and five CIDG killed; ten USASF and 16 CIDG were wounded. Nineteen weapons were captured from the enemy.

During the period 30 January through 2 February, Kontum city (Detachment B-24) received numerous mortar and rocket attacks accompanied by company size probes. In several instances the enemy penetrated the B-24 compound perimeter but were quickly repelled by supporting gunships. Friendly losses were six CIDG killed. There were also 18 USASF, 13 US, and eight CIDG soldiers wounded. Enemy losses were 110 NVA killed.

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On 6 February, a reaction force from Trang Phuoc, A-233, which consisted of one CSF company, two USASF and one VNSF, was fired on by an estimated company of VC in the city of Dalat. An exchange of small arms fire resulted in 22 VC killed; twelve small arms and three crew served weapons were captured. On the same day another reaction force from An Lac, A-234, which consisted of one CSF company, two USASF and one VNSF, was inserted into Dalat. It was fired upon by an estimated platoon of VC. When contact was broken, five VC had been killed and three weapons were captured. Friendly losses were two CSF soldiers wounded.

On 18 February, a CSF company from Luong Son, A-237, which was deployed in defense of Phan Thiet, established heavy contact with a VC battalion. Enemy losses during the contact were 35 killed. Three small arms and two crew served weapons were captured. Friendly losses were two USASF and one VNSF, and 23 CSF soldiers wounded.

A joint reconnaissance in force operation, which consisted of three CSF companies from Cung Son, A-221, Dong Tri, A-222, and Vinh Thanh, A-120, made contact on 23 February with an estimated VC battalion located ten kilometers north of Qui Nhon. A firefight ensued and gunships, artillery, and airstrikes were called on the enemy locations. Twenty-three VC were killed and one wounded VC was captured. Eight enemy weapons were seized. Friendly losses were five CSF soldiers killed; four USASF and 14 CSF soldiers were wounded.

On 23 February, a combat reconnaissance platoon from Trung Dung, A-502, ambushed an estimated platoon of NVA nine kilometers west of Nha Trang. Eight NVA were killed and seven weapons were captured. One CIDG soldier was wounded.

(b) March. During the month of March, 294 company size operations and 630 platoon size operations were conducted. Enemy losses during the month were 280 VC killed, 26 wounded, and 21 captured. Friendly losses were 59 CIDG four RF/FF, four VNSF, and four USASF killed. Wounded included 209 CIDG, nine RF/FF, four VNSF and 22 USASF personnel. Summaries of the significant contacts follow.

On 16 March a platoon size reconnaissance in force operation from Dong Tre, A-222, which was reacting to intelligence received from a prisoner, infiltrated a village 30 kilometers northwest of Tuy Hoa. While searching the village, the friendly force came under intense small arms fire. The CSF immediately returned the fire and killed 12 VC.

On 24 March, a MSF company, which was committed as a reaction force north of the city of Ban Me Thuot, made contact with an estimated company of NVA 20 kilometers north of Ban Me Thuot. Small arms fire was exchanged and gunships placed suppressive fire on the enemy positions. Nine NVA were killed and four weapons were captured. On 25 March, the same MSF company located an estimated two NVA companies in a bunker complex 21 kilometers north of Ban Me Thuot. Tactical air support was requested and received. Later another MSF company was inserted to reinforce the element in contact. Friendly losses in this contact were one USASF killed, and two USASF and eight MSF soldiers wounded.

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A company size reconnaissance in force operation from Duc Lap A-239, made contact on 20 March with an estimated battalion of NVA 40 kilometers southwest of Ban Me Thuot. A fire fight developed and airstrikes were called on enemy positions. Twenty NVA were killed and six weapons were seized. Friendly losses were one CSF soldier killed and seven wounded.

Also on 29 March, a platoon size operation from Dong Tre, A-222, ambushed an unknown size VC unit 40 kilometers northwest of Tuy Hoa. Small arms fire was exchanged and 20 VC were killed. One carbine was captured.

(c) April. During the month of April, 276 company size operations and 717 platoon size operations were conducted. Enemy losses were 130 enemy killed 25 wounded and 20 captured. Friendly losses included 31 CIDG, two VNSF, and one USASF killed; 121 CIDG, three VNSF, and three USASF were wounded. Summaries of significant actions follow.

On 10 April, the lead element of a company size operation from Cung Son, A-221, activated a booby trap 45 kilometers west of Tuy Hoa. The resulting explosion wounded nine CSF soldiers.

A company of VC supported by mortars overran a hasty ambush position occupied by a company size operation from Nhon Co, A-235, on 10 April. Friendly losses were one USASF and three CSF soldiers killed and 12 CSF soldiers wounded. One VC was killed and one weapon was captured.

On 18 April a company size operation from Mang Buk, A-246, received small arms fire from a village located 10 kilometers north of Man Bud. The CSF immediately conducted a sweep of the village and captured 21 VC. Two VC were killed and two were wounded.

Contact with two NVA was initiated by a company size clearing operation from camp Phu Tuc, A-224, from a distance of ten meters on 20 April. The NVA broke contact and fled north. The operation was in pursuit when it located a weapons cache that contained 39 small arms, three crew served weapons, and assorted ammunition.

On 24 April, a company size operation from camp Vinh Thanh, A-120, found a cache site which contained the following items: 22 rounds of 60 mm mortar ammunition, four cases of blasting caps, nine anti-tank mines, and six cases of AK-47 ammunition. The CSF moved from the area of the cache and were ambushed by an unknown number of VC who broke contact and withdrew north. There was one CSF soldier wounded.

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(3)(C) III CTZ. The intensity of enemy actions during the Tet offensive did not directly affect any operational A or B detachments. The VC/NVA increased harassing actions against many USASF/VNSF installations within III CTZ, but launched no major ground attacks against any camp. Generally, the most significant result of the VC Tet offensive was the temporary interdiction of overland routes of communication from subordinate detachments to Company A, Bien Hoa. The Tet offensive and the subsequent tank attack on the Lang Vei SF camp in I CTZ caused Company A to conduct a study on anti-tank defense procedures and capabilities. Anti-tank defense measures were initiated in those camps particularly threatened by armor attack. Each of these camps, formed and trained a minimum of ten tank-killer teams. Company A operations were highlighted by operations RAPIDFIRE VII and VIII conducted by Detachment "B" 36 in response to missions assigned by CG, II FFV. These operations are discussed in the Special Operations portion of this report. In addition four multi-company helimobile operations (Verdun, Tamatta Shanes, Thrasher II, and Thrasher III) were conducted. These operations involved MSF companies from A-302 and two CSF companies. There were a total of 1452 company size day operations conducted throughout the III CTZ during the reporting period including 58 airmobile operations. The construction of the new Special Forces camps at Duc Hue, A-351, Thien Ngon, A-323, and Katum, A-322, continues.

(a) February. During the month of February a total of 112 company size operations were conducted which accounted for 139 enemy killed and nine captured. Friendly losses were 17 CIDG killed, 164 CIDG wounded, nine USASF, and two VNSF personnel wounded. The significant contacts during February follow.

On 1 February, Camp Thien Ngon, Detachment A-323, Tay Ninh Province, received an estimated 105 rounds of 82 mm mortar fire from a location north of the camp. Five US engineers and two CSF soldiers were wounded. The engineers were attached from the 588th Engineer Battalion for the purpose of camp construction. In another mortar attack on 8 February, Camp Thien Ngon received approximately 20 rounds of 82 mm mortar fire from the east, west, and southeast at a range of 1500 to 2000 meters. Ten more CSF soldiers were wounded in this attack.

On 10 February, a combined road clearing and security operation, which consisted of CSF elements from Camp Trang Sup, A-301, Camp Thien Ngon, A-323, and elements of the 588th US Engineer Battalion, were ambushed by a VC company on highway 22, approximately 25 kilometers northwest of Tay Ninh. The enemy opened fire with automatic weapons, rockets, and grenades from both sides of the road. The results of the ambush were one US engineer and one CSF soldier killed, 20 US engineers and one CSF soldiers wounded, one US engineer captured (confirmed), and one US engineer missing in action (possibly captured). One tractor towed dirt scraper was destroyed. On 15 February, another road clearing and security operation from Camp Thien Ngon, supported by engineers from the 588th US Engineer Battalion, was again ambushed by an estimated VC company on highway 22, 32 kilometers northwest of Tay Ninh city. After a fifteen minute fire fight, the enemy broke contact and withdrew east. The results of this encounter were 10 US engineers killed and one USASF advisor, two CSF soldiers, and seven US engineers wounded.

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On 22 February, a company size reconnaissance in force operation from Ben Soi, A-321, which was reinforced by RF elements, engaged a reinforced VC company 20 kilometers southwest of Tay Ninh city. Friendly forces initiated contact with the enemy who were occupying defensive positions 100 meters away and were armed with AK-47 rifles, RPG rockets, 60 mm mortars, LM3's, and assorted small arms. They were dressed in the conventional black pajama uniform. Friendly forces were reinforced by one CSF company from Ben Soi and one CSF company from Trang Sup, A-301. An intense two and one half hour firefight ensued before the VC broke contact and withdrew to the southwest. Friendly losses were one RF soldier killed, two CSF and three RF soldiers wounded. Eight enemy were killed and 13 small arms were captured.

On 26 February from positions located 32 kilometers west of Song Ba city, a company size reconnaissance in force operation from camp Bu Dop, A-341, Phuoc Long Province ambushed a solid green, 2 1/2 ton NVA military truck. The truck was loaded with troops and was moving south toward the Cambodian border. The enemy truck was halted precisely in the ambush "killing zone" and was caught in a deadly crossfire from M-79 grenade launchers and automatic small arms fire. One USASF and one CSF soldier were wounded. Seventeen NVA were killed and two wounded. Sixteen small arms and two crew served weapons were captured. The 2 1/2 ton truck was totally destroyed.

On 25 February, a company size operations departed camp Ben Soi, A-321 in reaction to intelligence information obtained from the villagers of Phuoc Tan. Border crossers stated that tanks had been observed on the Cambodian side of the Soi camps. On 26 February, one CRP was left to secure a rally point while two recon platoons moved west to set up ambush positions. While moving toward the proposed ambush positions, the lead CRP observed an estimated VC company and three tanks in a bivouac position. The VC were standing around camp fires. The tanks were parked and their motors were turned off. No enemy security elements were posted. The two recon platoons deployed on line and moved silently toward the enemy position. The friendly force advanced to within 20 meters of the enemy and took up firing positions. The three tanks were south of the main bivouac area and the nearest one was 175 meters from friendly element. A CRP platoon leader readied an M-72 LAW for firing and took aim on the near tank while instructions were passed to open fire when the senior USASF advisor fired the first shot. When the USASF advisor fired, all friendlies opened fire simultaneously. The VC were caught completely by surprise. The M-72 LAW hit the near tank at the base of the turret and caused a large secondary explosion. A fire glow of multi-colored tracer rounds burst from the top of the turret. The remaining two tanks started their engines and withdrew west across the Cambodian border. By then the VC had reorganized and had begun to return automatic weapons fire and RPG-2 fire. The firefight continued for 30 minutes when the VC broke contact and withdrew west. The two CRP's then began withdrawing to the rally point when one CSF reported seeing a half track type vehicle with a quad-50 mounted on it. During the process of withdrawing they were engaged by an estimated two companies of VC. A 10 minute firefight ensued and two CSF were wounded. The CSF then broke contact and

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withdrew to the rally point. Sporadic small arms fire was received for another 30 minutes as the entire friendly force withdrew. Having expended all ammunition, the CSF returned to camp. Friendly losses were two CSF wounded. Enemy losses were one tank (believed to be a PT-76) heavily damaged, if not destroyed. An estimated 30 VC were killed or wounded, but enemy losses could not be confirmed. One AK-47 rifle was captured.

On 28 February, Camp Bunard, A-344, Phuoc Long Province, received approximately 20 rounds of 82 mm mortar fire which impacted in the inner perimeter. The camp returned fire with mortar and artillery. After a ten minute exchange of fire, the enemy withdrew. Fifteen CSF soldiers were wounded during the attack.

(b) March. During the month of March, the number of operations conducted increased substantially over the number of conducted during February. However, the number of enemy contacts and enemy killed were only one half as much as they were for the month of February. A total of 555 company size operations were conducted during the month of March and accounted for 69 enemy killed and 23 enemy captured. Friendly losses were 48 CIDG and one VNSF killed, 129 CIDG, six VNSF, and three USASF wounded, and four CIDG missing in action.

On 3 March, a company size reconnaissance in force operation from camp Chi Linh, A-333, engaged an estimated platoon of VC 33 kilometers southeast of Hon Quan city. A brief exchange of fire ensued before the enemy broke contact and withdrew north. Friendly losses were two CSF soldiers wounded. Enemy losses were one VC wounded, and 41,500 rounds of small arms ammunition, forty two 82 mm mortar rounds, 57 pounds of explosives, and three bicycles captured, twelve bicycles and 25 pounds of explosives were destroyed.

On 8 March, a company size operation from camp Katum, A-322, received 20 rounds of 82 mm mortar fire from a position approximately 40 kilometers northwest of Tay Ninh city. Friendly losses were eight CSF soldiers killed and 10 wounded.

A company size reconnaissance in force operation from camp Tra Cu, A-352, was engaged by an estimate platoon of VC on 10 March in an area 14 kilometers west of Duc Hoa city. The enemy initiated the contact with small arms, which included automatic weapons, and M-79 grenade launchers, from a distance of 200 meters. The friendly force returned fire and assaulted the enemy position. A FAC was on station and light fire teams were requested. In addition, a reaction force was dispatched from camp Tra Cu to assist the element in contact. Before a link-up could be established, the reaction force made contact and became heavily engaged with an estimated VC battalion. Link-up was never established and the friendly forces broke contact after a four hour engagement and returned to camp. Tactical air, supported by light fire teams, placed airstrikes on the enemy while the friendly forces withdrew. Friendly losses were 13 CSF soldiers killed, seven wounded, one missing and two individual weapons lost. Enemy losses were four VC killed. A FAC bomb assessment credited 52 more VC killed by air.

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On 14 March, camp Katum, A-322, received approximately 100 rounds of 120 mm mortar, 82 mm mortar, and RPG fire and one round of CS type gas of unknown caliber. The enemy fire came from the southeast at an estimated range of 2,500 meters. The camp returned fire with mortar and artillery and called tactical air in support. The results were eight CSF soldiers killed and 25 wounded. On the following day, five more CSF soldiers were wounded when the camp received 21 rounds of 82 mm mortar fire.

On 16 March, a company size operation from camp Bu Dop, A-341, ambushed two NVA trucks from a distance of 25 meters approximately 33 kilometers northeast of Song Be city. After a short fire fight, the enemy broke contact and fled on foot. Friendly losses were one CSF soldier wounded. Two NVA were killed and one individual weapon was captured. Two 3/4 ton trucks were destroyed.

On 16 March, a MSF company size reconnaissance in force operation from Detachment B-36 found a cache 17 kilometers west-northwest of Duc Hoa city. The cache contained 25 individual weapons, one crew served weapon, twenty-six 60 mm mortar rounds, 80 chicom grenades, two US claymores, 300 pounds of medical supplies, and five pounds of documents.

Heliborne operation Verdun was conducted during the period 19 March to 23 March in the area northeast of Loc Ninh and southwest of Bu Dop. Four MSF companies and two CSF companies comprised the two task forces. On 19 March, the friendly element was engaged by an estimated VC platoon from a distance of 150 meters approximately 25 kilometers north-northwest of Hon Quan city. After a brief fire fight, the enemy broke contact and withdrew north. Friendly losses were two CSF soldiers killed. Enemy losses were nine VC killed, two VC captured, and six small arms captured.

Heliborne operation Tamatta Shanee was conducted from 23 March through 28 March in the southwestern portion of Phuoc Long Province. The operation was conducted by two task forces which operated from separate patrol bases. Contacts however, were few and small. Total enemy losses were six VC killed and one VC wounded. Friendly casualties were one MSF soldier killed, one USASF and six MSF soldier wounded. Approximately 16,000 pounds of bagged rice, one 500 pound bomb, 12 bicycles, and 30-40 heavy bunkers were destroyed.

On 27 March, a company size reconnaissance in force operation from camp Thien Ngon, A-323, was engaged by an unknown size VC force armed with semi-automatic and automatic small arms 37 kilometers north-northwest of Tan Ninh city. The friendly force split into two elements. The smaller element broke contact and moved with their wounded to an extraction LZ which was located one mile southeast of the contact area. The main element was surrounded and in heavy contact. A standby company from camp Thien Ngon was inserted into the area to reinforce the element in contact. Later in the day, all friendly forces broke contact and were extracted from the area by helicopter. Friendly losses were three CSF soldiers killed, 27 wounded, three CSF missing, and three helicopters damaged by ground fire. Had friendly forces not received superior fire support

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when it was required, the superior small arms firepower of the VC would have led to a major loss of friendly forces.

On 27 March, a company of CSF from camp Tong Le Chon, A-334, was inserted into an area 20 kilometers east of Hon Quan to act as a rear reaction force for Detachment B-56, which was in heavy contact. Shortly thereafter, the operation became engaged in a contact initiated by a reinforced VC company. The VC utilized RPG rockets, mortars, and small arms from a distance of approximately 150 meters. After a 90 minute exchange of fire, the friendly element broke contact under the cover of gunships and artillery. The results of this operation were five CSF soldiers killed, two USASF, one VNSF, and 13 CSF soldiers wounded. Enemy losses were five VC killed.

(c) April. During the month of April there were 519 company size operations and a total of 137 enemy killed and 10 captured. Friendly losses were four USASF killed, seven USASF wounded, one VNSF killed, seven VNSF wounded, 60 CIDG killed, 135 CIDG wounded, and 19 CIDG missing in action. Operations during April were oriented toward increased border surveillance and interdiction of enemy line of communications.

On 5 April, camps Duc Hue and Tra Cu conducted a combined Helimobile operation, Land Rover III, in Hau Nghia Province. This operation was in direct response to intelligence stating that a large VC base area was located north northwest of Tra Cu. Upon insertion, the first friendly element established a blocking force and shortly thereafter spotted approximately 100 VC armed with automatic weapons. The blocking force immediately took the VC unit under fire and moved out in pursuit of the VC. The second friendly element was then inserted to block the VC avenue of escape. Gunships and artillery were called in and an intensive firefight ensued. The initial blocking force element became pinned down by an estimated VC company in well fortified bunker positions. LFT's concentrated on freeing this entrapped element but were unable to suppress the enemy's fire superiority. A1E Skyraiders and F105 jets conducted airstrikes. Heavy contact still continued for the remainder of the day. At approximately sunset the VC broke contact and the friendly forces were extracted. The final results were one US pilot and one CSF soldier killed, two US helicopter crewmen, two USASF, one VNSF and six CSF soldiers wounded, and four CSF missing in action. Enemy losses were 16 VC killed and six weapons captured. FAC estimated that an additional 40 VC were killed by airstrikes. One noteworthy observation during the contact was that the VC bunker system was able to withstand bombardment by 500 pound bombs and heavy artillery with no apparent effect on its occupants.

On 6 April, a company of CSF soldiers from camp Thien Ngon, A-323, moved from their overnight position located approximately five kilometers north of camp Thien Ngon. After a one hour march, they were ambushed by an estimated enemy company, which was set up in an "L" shaped ambush position. Intense automatic weapons fire and B-40 rockets were received from the front and from the left flank. Artillery was called in on the ambush positions and the friendly element broke contact and withdrew to the closest LZ to evacuate wounded. An artillery

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air observer arrived and adjusted the artillery while contact was being broken. Friendly losses were four CSF soldiers killed, 28 CSF soldiers wounded, and one USASF slightly wounded. Enemy casualties are unknown.

On 8 April, camp Katum, A-322, received 17 rounds of 82 mm mortar fire from a location southeast of the camp. The five rounds which impacted inside the camp, killed nine CSF soldiers and wounded one USASF and three CSF soldiers. Later on the same day, camp Katum received an unknown type of munition containing a riot control type gas. The gas had a moderate effect on the camp personnel. On the following day, 50 rounds of 82 mm mortar fire were received and one USASF advisor was wounded.

On 20 April at 0305 hours, camp Tra Cu, A-352, began receiving incoming RPG-7, B-40, 75 mm RR and 82 mm mortar rounds in and around the camp. The fire came from three directions; from the west, across the open ground, from the north, across the Vam Co Dong River, and the east across the Binh Gay Canal. At 200330 hours a ground attack was launched from the west and continued until 0430 when the main VC force withdrew on all sides. At one point in the ground attack a VC squad reached the camp inner perimeter berm and five VC almost gained access into the inner compound. They were immediately repulsed by CSF personnel. One CSF member had refused to fire on the attackers and attempted to turn a .30 caliber MG into the inner compound, but he was apprehended before this act could be completed. It was later determined that a large VC infrastructure did exist within the camp. These VC suspects were apprehended the next day. The VC were unable to succeed in their attempt to overrun the camp and it is believed they were relying heavily on the help that they expected to receive from within the camp itself. The results of the attack were 68 VC killed, one VC captured, four VC suspects captured, 34 weapons, numerous munitions and two pounds of documents captured. Friendly losses were six CSF killed, five VNSF, and 13 CSF wounded and one CSF missing. The deciding factor in spoiling this attack was the tremendous support received from flareship and Spooky aircraft. These support elements arrived on site minutes after the attack was launched.

On 26 April, a company size clearing operation from Camp Thien Ngon, A-323, was engaged by an estimated VC company with automatic weapons and RPG fire from a distance of ten meters. The contact occurred 36 kilometers northwest of Tay Ninh City. Friendly forces returned fire, then broke contact to call artillery on enemy positions. After a two hour engagement, friendly forces withdrew to a landing zone to evacuate their wounded. Friendly losses were one USASF and eight CSF soldiers wounded, and 13 CSF soldiers missing in action.

On 30 April, camp Ben Soi, A-321, received 15 rounds of 82 mm mortar fire and small arms fire from the east. The camp returned fire with mortars and artillery. Friendly losses were one CSF soldier killed, three USASF and 19 CSF soldiers wounded.

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(4)(C)IV CTZ. The initial onslaught of the Viet Cong Tet offensive in the operational area of Company D saw major attacks conducted against US/GVN forces and facilities at Moc Hoa, Chau Doc, and Cao Lanh. Primarily in reaction to the Tet offensive, the past quarter began with significant increases in friendly small unit and special operations. Consequently, the number of significant contacts and subsequent results also increased. As the offensive ended, the Viet Cong returned to safer operational and base areas only to be hit and harassed in March and April by rapidly expanded friendly operations. As a result of the new company saturation patrolling policy which requires each camp to maintain an operation (the size of which varies from squad to multi-company) in all portions of their TAOR at all times, a 500% increase in these patrol operations has resulted since the program was initiated on 1 February. At the same time, a 50% increase in company size operations has been noted. The major result of these operations has been the destruction or capture of large amounts of Viet Cong supplies. Since 1 February, units subordinate to Company D have conducted 1761 company, 8381 platoon and 11 squad size operations. 141 friendly initiated contacts were made. A special operation, coded SNAKEMAN, was inserted in Kien Tuong and Kien Phong Provinces with 130 MSF and nine Americans. Its mission was to conduct guerrilla operations, interdict known land and water infiltration routes and conduct search and destroy operations against known and suspected VC installations. Three separate phases of this operation have been inserted to date. Another special operation, coded NEWPORT, was inserted on 13 March 1968 with 150 MSF and six USASF. Its AO was in Kien Giang Province, south of Vinh Gia. Its mission was to interdict VC communication and supply routes in the area and to conduct search and destroy operations against known and suspected VC installations. Phase I of the operation ended on 28 March with negative results. Phase II of this operation commenced on 10 April 1968 under the code SLINGERHAMMER. Two MSF and two CSF companies were committed to the operational area. Delta Falcon operations began in IV Corps in mid-March. The operations were initially conducted in the Kien Tuong area by troops from A-412 and A-433 and later in Kien Giang Province by CSF and MSF troops from Detachment A-421 and B-440 respectively. The basic concept of this operation is to seek out and destroy VC base areas, resupply points, and infiltration routes using Cobra Gunships. Once a fix is made on a VC position, reaction troops are immediately brought in by UH-1D helicopters to engage any VC in the area and assess the damage and losses sustained by the enemy. The strong point of this operation is its mobility and quick reaction time. Results so far have been significant. During a two week operational period, for example, it netted 18 VC killed, 24 captured, 150 sampans damaged or destroyed, 53 buildings destroyed, three weapons, food, documents, and medical supplies captured. Friendly losses were four CSF wounded. Two companies of MSF are now on constant standby for the Delta Falcon project. If contact is made with a sufficiently large VC force, additional troops from the nearest "A" Camp may also be committed. In April, Company D established a Forward Operations Center (FOC) at Cao Lanh. The FOC will consolidate and monitor all Special Forces Operational Reports to the 14th STZ and Company D, 5th SFMA. In addition, the FOC will consolidate and process all Special Forces requests for tactical air and tactical helicopter support. The FOC will have an intelligence section

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which will consolidate all intelligence received from the B detachments and forward it to Company D and the 44th STZ. To supervise the FOC, the position of Company D Deputy Commander has been established. The Deputy will be assigned to the FOC on a permanent basis. In addition, the CO, USASF Company D and the CO, VNSF Detachment C-4 will commute to Gao Lanh on a daily basis to coordinate Special Forces command and operational matters with the Senior Advisor and the Commander 44th STZ. The construction of camp Thanh Tri, A-444 has progressed rapidly since its insertion on 15 March 1968. Construction continues on camp My Dien II within the month of May, My Dien II is expected to become fully operational, running regular operations throughout its TAOR.

(a) February. During the month of February a total of 395 company size operations and 1738 platoon size operations were conducted. Enemy losses were 387 killed, 20 wounded, and 91 captured. Friendly losses included 46 CIDG, 110 RF/PF, and two VNSF killed. Wounded in action were 120 CIDG, 35 RF/PF, six VNSF, and 21 USASF personnel. Significant contacts follow.

During the period 29 January - 5 February, Company D and the Can Tho airfield complex received approximately 150-175 rounds of enemy indirect fire. On the morning of 31 January, Company D and the city of Can Tho came under attack. Heavy fighting continued in the city until 1 February. A mortar attack, which was directed at the Company D compound on 2 February, resulted in three USASF wounded. A fire that resulted in the S4 storage was extinguished after only a slight loss of equipment. On 4 February, the city of Can Tho was secured and friendly units were in light contact with the VC on the outer edges of the city. During the period, a total of 86 local civilians were killed and 548 homes or structures were destroyed. Friendly forces suffered 24 RF/PF, 17 ARVN, and 12 ARVN Rangers killed.

On 31 January at 0145 hours, Detachment B-42 and the city of Chau Doc came under attack by an estimated reinforced VC company. Initially the city was infiltrated by small groups which established themselves in key locations which enabled them to take control over the majority of the city. Mass casualties and extensive damage to the city mounted after four days of fighting. Approximately 1/4 of the city (1239 homes) was destroyed by fire. The PRU in conjunction with the SEALs formed small well armed fire teams and cleared the majority of the key positions held by the enemy. On 2 February, the VC began to withdraw by using civilians as cover. Friendly losses during the fighting were two US, 56 RF/PF, three PRU, and over 100 civilians killed. Three US, 100 RF/PF, and over 100 civilians were wounded. The enemy lost 122 VC killed and an unknown number were wounded. Three key enemy leaders and 20 weapons were captured.

On 2 February at 0400 hours, Detachment B-41 and the city of Moc Hoa came under a mortar and round attack by an estimated two VC battalions. Heavy fighting continued throughout the morning with sporadic firefights reported during the afternoon. By 3 February, the fighting has dwindled to light sniper fire within the city. Friendly losses were three RF, three CSF, four ARVN, three National Police, and seven civilians killed. One CSF, four US, 16 ARVN,

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and 27 civilians were wounded. Confirmed enemy losses were 136 VC killed. An additional 80 VC dead were buried (not US confirmed), and 87 weapons were captured.

On 7 February, an estimated VC Battalion attacked the city of Cao Lanh and the B-43 compound. A three hour and 30 minute firefight ensued and ended with the VC breaking contact and withdrawing in all directions. Enemy losses were 41 VC killed and 42 weapons captured. Friendly losses were two MACV advisors, one ARVN, and five RF/PF soldiers killed, and 13 MACV advisors, two USASF, two VNSF, and 25 RF/PF soldiers wounded.

On 9 February, a reconnaissance in force operation, which consisted of three USASF, one CSF company one CRP, one MACV advisor, and one ARVN battalion from Cao Lanh, came in contact with an estimated 2 VC companies. A heavy firefight developed and at 1230 hours the 44th STZ assumed control over the operations. At 1305 hours the ARVN battalion was ordered to withdraw. One CSF company and one CRP remained in contact. At 1800 hours the two friendly elements withdrew and the operation was terminated. Results of this action were 16 VC killed, one VC captured, and five weapons captured. Friendly losses were one RF and three ARVN soldiers killed, and three CSF, one RF, and 11 ARVN soldiers wounded.

On 14 February a platoon size operation from camp Binh Thanh Thon, A-413, initiated contact with an estimated VC platoon 15 kilometers northwest of Moc Hoa. A fire fight between the two forces ended with the VC breaking contact. Results of the engagement were 17 VC killed, two VC captured, one 60 mm mortar, one AK-47 assault rifle, one PRG-25 radio, 100 rounds of 60 mm mortar ammunition, 40 RPG-2 rockets, and miscellaneous equipment captured. Friendly losses were one CSF soldier killed, and three CSF soldiers wounded.

On 18 February, the Company D compound in Can Tho came under mortar and recoilless rifle attack. The dispensary received a direct hit. The resulting fire completely destroyed the dispensary and the adjoining medical supply warehouse. The fire also caused heavy damage to the arms room and destroyed a large number of crew served weapons and small arms.

On 21 February, Detachment B-41 in Moc Hoa uncovered a VC cache site only 200 meters from their compound. The cache site contained an extensive amount of mortar recoilless rifle ammunition, automatic and semi-automatic weapons, demolition, medical supplies, and signal equipment. Extraction was slow due to the presence of VC booby traps.

On 26 February, a reconnaissance in force operation consisting of two CSF companies and one RF company from Thuong Thoi, A-432, initiated contact with an estimated 150 VC in dug-in positions five kilometers north of Hong Nhu. Friendly elements assaulted the VC positions and were supported by 105 mm howitzer and 4.2 inch mortar fire. The friendly elements became pinned down by a heavy volume of enemy fire. Two air strikes were delivered on the VC position. Gunship support was requested but denied. A second assault was attempted, but

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the friendly elements again were pinned down. After an eight hour firefight, the friendly elements broke contact. Because of the impending darkness and lack of gunship support, the operation returned to base camp. Enemy casualties could not be confirmed; however, an estimated 10 VC were killed and another 15 wounded. Seventy structures and 10 sampans were destroyed. Friendly casualties were two CSF soldiers killed and three wounded.

(b) March. During the month of March, a total of 577 company size operations and 3241 platoon size operations were conducted. Enemy losses were 195 killed, 72 wounded, and 74 captured. Friendly losses included 12 CIDG and 57 RF/PF killed. A total of 110 CIDG, 238 RF/PF, one VNSF, and 13 USASF were wounded. Summaries of significant contacts follow.

On 7 March, two CSF platoons from camp Kinh Quan II, A-412, ambushed a VC squad and killed seven VC. Two Russian carbines were captured.

On 13 March, MSF operation Newport commenced when one MSF company was airlanded into an LZ 11 kilometers southwest of camp Vinh Gia, A-419. Their mission was to interdict enemy logistical activities in the area. On the morning of 15 March, contact was established with a VC squad and sporadic contact with small enemy units continued throughout the day. Gunships placed fire at 1145 hours on enemy positions and initiated a series of secondary explosions which lasted for 90 minutes. Apparently a large VC cache site was destroyed. At 1955 hours, the friendly elements received 60 mm mortar fire which was followed by a ground attack by an estimated VC battalion. Results of this action were one USASF and three MSF soldiers wounded.

On 14 March, elements of a MSF company participating in operation Snakeman were ambushed by an unknown number of VC 40 kilometers northwest of Moc Hoa. One USASF and eight MSF soldiers were wounded. Two VC were killed in the engagement and a search of the ambush site the following day indicated that several VC bodies had been carried away during the night.

On 14 March, one MSF company and one CSF company departed on an operation to relocate camp Moc Hoa, A-414. During that week Detachment A-412, Phu Quoc Island, (IV CTZ CIDG Training Center) was relocated to camp To Chau. Detachments A-402 and A-403 and their MSF assets were relocated from To Chau to Moc Hoa.

On 17 March, a reconnaissance in force operation, which consisted on one CSF company, two CRP, four USASF, and four VNSF from camp Cai Cai, A-431, initiated contact with two enemy platoons 45 kilometers northwest of Moc Hoa. The enemy were believed to be NVA. A one hour and 40 minute fire fight terminated after the enemy broke contact and withdrew across the border into Cambodia. They carried a number of their dead with them. Three enemy bodies and three M-1 rifles were left on the battlefield. If the enemy encountered were in fact NVA, this would mark the first time contact was established with an NVA unit by USASF advised forces in IV CTZ.

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On 17 March, two CSF companies from camp Kinh Quan II, A-412, initiated contact with one VC squad 35 kilometers northeast of Sa Dec. Small arms fire was exchanged and the VC attempted to flee south. Results of this contact were 11 VC captured.

On 25 March, one CSF company from camp Ba Xoai, acting as a Delta Falcon reaction force, conducted a raid on a VC base area 45 kilometers south of Chau Doc. A 15 minute exchange of fire occurred before the VC broke contact and fled northeast. Results of this action were 10 VC killed. Five small arms, assorted small arms ammunition, communications equipment, medical equipment, and documents were captured. Destroyed were 1,000 kilograms of rice, 500 kilograms of dried fish, 20 sampans, and 25 structures.

On 25 March, two CSF platoons from camp Ba Xoai, A-421, initiated contact with two VC platoons during a reconnaissance in force operation conducted 45 kilometers west of Long Xuyen. The friendly forces assaulted and overran the VC positions after a 15 minute firefight. Four VC were killed; nine VC and two weapons were captured. Twenty structures and 52 sampans were destroyed; 48 sampans were damaged. Two CSF soldiers were wounded during the action.

(c) April. During the month of April, a total of 789 company size operations and 3353 platoon size operations were conducted. Enemy losses were 257 killed, 44 wounded, and 129 captured. Friendly losses were 69 CIDG, 21 RF/PF, one VNSF, and one USASF killed. Eighty-six CIDG, 86 RF/PF, and five USASF personnel were wounded. Summaries of significant contacts follow.

On 2 April, one NSF company on operation Snakeman encountered three VC platoons 40 kilometers northwest of Hoc Hoa. A fierce firefight forced the VC to withdraw toward the Cambodian border. A sweep of the area confirmed 15 VC killed. One USASF and four CSF soldiers were wounded.

Three CSF platoons from Camp Ba Xoai, A-421, and one NSF platoon were inserted on 7 April into an area 50 kilometers northwest of Rach Gia in response to a PW interrogation report. The PW acted as a guide and led the friendly elements to a large arms and ammunition cache. On the following morning the operation located a second cache in the same vicinity. Equipment captured consisted of 29 crew served weapons, 191 small arms weapons, 230 mortar rounds, 161 57 mm recoilless rifle rounds, 274 RPG-2 and RPG-7 rockets, 237,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 18 anti-personnel mines, eight cases of medical equipment, and one 82 mm mortar bipod.

On 11 April, a joint reconnaissance in force operation, which consisted of four CSF companies, two CRP's, four USASF, and six VNSF from camps Kinh Quan II, A-412, and My Day, A-433, initiated contact with one VC platoon 32 kilometers north of Vinh Long. After a brief exchange of fire, the VC broke contact and withdrew east. One CSF soldier was killed and four were wounded in the contact. Three hours later, at a point 1,500 meters north-northwest of the first contact, the operation established contact with and became surrounded by two VC battalions.

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The VC were armed with semi-automatic and automatic weapons and 120 mm mortars. Friendly elements were supported by artillery, gunships, and airstrike. After two hours of fighting, the VC broke contact and withdrew east. Results of this contact were one VC suspect detained, one VNSF and eight CSF soldiers killed, eight CSF soldiers wounded, and 14 CSF soldiers missing. Friendly elements lost one A-6 light machine gun, 30 small arms, and one PRC-25 radio.

On 15 April, one CSF platoon from camp Tuyen Nhon, A-415, initiated contact with one VC company 23 kilometers east of Moc Hoa during a Delta Falcon operation. The VC broke contact and withdrew south. Fourteen VC were killed (confirmed) and an additional 18 VC were estimated killed.

On 17 April, a platoon size patrol from camp Binh Thanh Thon, A-413, located and destroyed a permanent type VC base camp. Included in the base camp were a hospital, mess hall, and billets. Captured material included five B-44 rockets, 18 B-40 rockets, and 10,000 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition. An airstrike was delivered on the base camp after the friendly elements withdrew from the area.

On 18 April, two MSF companies on operation Sledgehammer located a VC village 32 kilometers east southeast of Ha Tien. Friendly elements destroyed 32 structures, six sampans, and 500 kilograms of rice. Later in the day friendly elements initiated contact with 12 VC near the village. Results of this contact were five VC killed.

On 19 April at 1830 hours, one MSF company on operation Snakeman initiated contact with an estimated VC squad 37 kilometers northwest of Moc Hoa. While assaulting the VC positions, approximately 200 VC appeared from concealed bunkers which were located on the company's flank. The VC were armed with 60 mm mortars, light machine guns and AK-47 assault rifles. The MSF company was overrun. The results of this action were one USASF and 41 MSF soldiers killed, one USASF and 23 MSF soldiers wounded, and seven MSF soldiers missing. Friendly elements also lost two crew served weapons, 54 small arms, three radios, and 138 rucksacks. Two CSF companies, which reacted to the request for assistance, failed to reestablish contact with the enemy force.

On 21 April, a platoon size patrol from Ba Xoi, A-421, located and destroyed a company size VC base area 35 kilometers east of Ha Tien. Indications were that the base camp had not been used in several months. The patrol located and destroyed a well concealed, and recently evacuated, 100 bed hospital 3,500 meters north of the base camp.

On 22 April, one MSF company on a Delta Falcon operation initiated contact with an unknown size VC force 37 kilometers north of Cao Lanh. Sporadic contact was maintained for four and one half hours, at which time the MSF company was extracted. There were no friendly casualties. Eighteen VC were killed, 14 of which were killed by air. Four VC and three small arms were captured.

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A reconnaissance in force operation, which consisted of two CSF companies from camp Binh Thanh Thon, A-413, and one CSF company from camp Kinh Quan II, A-412, initiated contact with two VC platoons on 24 April. The contact occurred 12 kilometers northwest of Moc Hoa. A fierce 90 minute fire fight was followed by supporting fire from Cobra gunships. The enemy broke contact and withdrew north. Results of this contact were 17 VC killed, 14 of which were killed by air; two chicom light machine guns and four AK-47 assault rifles were captured. Friendly losses were two CSF soldiers killed and 10 wounded. Two light observation helicopters were shot down and two US Army Pilots were wounded. One of the helicopters was recovered, but the other sank in a river.

## (S) ~~(C)~~ Special Operations.

(a) Operation Rapid fire VII (B-36) was conducted during the period 18 February - 24 March in Hau Nghia Province, III CTZ. The operation consisted of a headquarters and communication section, two MSF companies and 10 reconnaissance teams which were augmented by 25 IRFP personnel from II FFV assets. There were four company, 11 platoon, and 40 team operations conducted which resulted in 35 contacts. Enemy losses were 44 killed, three wounded, and five captured. Fifteen weapons were also captured. Friendly losses were one US helicopter crewman killed, one USASF and one CIDG soldier wounded. One UH1D helicopter was destroyed. One MSF company which was attached to operation Big John I discovered a cache site that contained 23 weapons and assorted ammunition. Large enemy troop concentrations were also found within the area of operation. It was determined by the operation conducted that this area is not suitable for interdiction by small units because of the flat terrain and lack of foliage. Enemy units therefore can move at night in any direction without utilizing trails or canals.

(b) Operation Samurai IV (B-52 Project Delta) was conducted in Thua Thien Province I CTZ, during the period 4 March - 4 April under the OPCON of CG III MAF/CG Provisional Corps Vietnam. The task organization consisted of a headquarters and communications section, 10 recon teams, 10 roadrunner teams, three companies of the 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion (ARVN), a MSF company, and a CIDG security platoon. There were 10 company, two platoon, and 18 team operations conducted and 20 contacts established. Thirty-one enemy were killed and one captured. An additional 38 enemy were killed by air support. Also captured were 15 weapons. There were two USASF personnel and 17 personnel from assets/augmentation units killed during operations. The operations revealed that a major road was being built or repaired, as required, from the Ashau Valley east toward Hue and Phu Bai. The road was being used extensively by enemy forces for logistical troop movement.

(c) Operation Rapidfire VIII (B-36) was conducted during the period 27 March - 15 April in the southeast portion of Phuoc Long Province, III CTZ. The composition of operational elements was the same as for Rapidfire VII. There were two company, two platoon, and nine team operations conducted which resulted in nine enemy contacts. There were 10 enemy killed; Two USASF personnel were killed and five were wounded. Airstrikes accounted for an additional five enemy killed.

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(6)(C) Summary of Significant Special Forces Activities During the Tet Offensive. The role of the CIDG during the tet offensive was unusual in that soldiers were taken from environment in the more remote portions of Vietnam and utilized in combat missions in and around the major population centers. The main shift in missions occurred in II and IV CTZ as operations in I and III CTZ were relatively unaffected by the tet offensive. This new role provided a challenge to the CIDG troops. With no training in the techniques of combat in cities, the CIDG troops effectively accomplished their assigned missions. Summaries of CIDG operations conducted in II and IV CTZ as a result of the tet offensive follow.

(a) In II Corps, CIDG units were committed on operations in seven provincial capitals. These operations resulted in 529 enemy killed, one wounded, 33 captured and 97 weapons seized. Friendly losses during the same period were 35 killed, 201 wounded and 5 weapons lost. Two MSF companies and two platoons from the C Detachment at Pleiku were committed on search and clear operations in Pleiku City. These MSF elements were instrumental in clearing NVA and VC units from the city. One MSF company from Pleiku was airlifted into the Ban Me Thout area to conduct mobile guerilla operations under the operational control of the 173 Airborne Brigade. This MSF unit ambushed small NVA elements that were using one extensive fall network around the city. Another MSF company and one CRP was airlifted from Pleiku to conduct search and clear operations in the city of Phan Thiet. One CSF company from Dak Pek, Detachment A-242, was committed to reinforce the Detachment B-24 compound in Kontum City. The company performed search and clear operations in and around the city. Two CSF companies from Trang Phuoc, A-222, one company from An Lac, A-234, and one company from Ngoc Co, A-235, were airlifted from their respective camps to Dalat to perform search and clear operations in the city. One CSF company from Phu Tuc, A-224, one CSF company from Cung Son, A-221, and one platoon and one 106RP section from Ha Tay, A-227, were airlifted from their respective camps to Qui Nhon and assigned the mission of clearing enemy units from the key installations in the city. The radio station, railroad yard and Military Security Service Headquarters were retaken from the enemy by CSF troops. Four MSF companies from Nha Trang, Detachment A-503 and six CSF companies from Trung Dung, Detachment A-502, were employed in Nha Trang City. The MSF provided security for the province prison and headquarters, while the CSF companies were used primarily to block escape routes from the city.

(b) In IV Corps the main enemy effort was also directed against the province and district capitals. CSF and MSF units were committed on operations in support of three provincial capitals. These operations resulted in 179 enemy killed, one wounded, 37 captured and 83 weapons seized. Friendly losses for the same period were 26 killed, and 65 wounded. One CRP from Moc Hoa, Detachment A-414, on a combined operation with the 4th Battalion, 11th ARVN Infantry conducted a house to house clearing operation to retake Moc Hoa City. One CRP platoon from Thung Thoi, A-432, one CSF company from Cai Cai, A-437, and one MSF company from Don Phuoc, A-402, were airlifted from their respective camps to Cao Lanh to conduct operations to clear the enemy elements that were dug in and around the city. Can Tho, Detachment C-4, provided one CSF company and one CRP to augment the defense of the Can Tho airfield.

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d. (S) Plans and Organization.

(1) A study was conducted to close Detachment B-42 at Chau Doc in IV CTZ; however, before close out could be effected, the plan was overtaken by the events that followed the enemy's Tet offensive. The close out has been delayed until an undetermined future date.

(2) The Tet offensive also resulted in the cancellation of the requirements for 5th SFGA participation in Operation York.

(3) The 5th SFGA Budget for 1969, which was prepared as a joint project between S3 Plans, S4, and the Comptroller, was submitted in April.

(4) The review and revision of MTOE 31-105E (Airborne Special Forces Group) and the TDA for Special Operations continued during the quarter and is being placed in final form for submission. Its submission was delayed pending approval or disapproval of the study mentioned below.

(5) A special and far-reaching study and plan, titled Concept of Operations for the Expanded Role of Special Forces in RVN, was prepared and submitted. This study which included eleven annexes, contained short-range plans (1968-69), mid-range plans (1969-70), and long-range plans (1970-?). The plan called for evaluation and realignment of present camps; establishment of interdiction TAOR's along the border which would evolve into a Border Control Zone for post-hostilities; expansion of the Mobile Strike Force to brigade size units in each CTZ and one based at Nha Trang as the country-wide reserve (the brigades are called Mobile Strike Force Commands); modernization of the weaponry throughout the CIDG program; employment of all available assets in support of the interdiction TAOR's/Border Control Zone; and the formation of the VNSF and CIDG into a Border Police/Constabulary Force for the post hostilities period. This concept was presented to USARV on 21 April and to COMUSMACV on 22 April.

(6) CIDG Camps.

(a) The scheduled transfer of camps Kinh Quan II and Thuong Thoi (IV CTZ) to VNSF control was deferred indefinitely. The VNSF HC requested the deferment because of the non-availability of VNSF assets.

(b) A number of the camps in all CTZ's scheduled for conversion, relocation opening, or closing were deferred or cancelled as a result of the Tet offensive.

e. (C) Training.

(1) General. Command emphasis on training continues to increase. The 5th SFGA Combat Orientation course was initiated on 8 April and programs of instruction and training schedules were revised on 30 April in a continuing effort to provide replacement training of maximum value to the individual and to subordinate commanders. A system of individual training records was

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simultaneously established to administer the program. A second project concerning the upgrading and reorganization of CIDG training was initiated in early April in an effort to meet present requirements. Advanced special subject programs for a vehicle and generator mechanics course are under preparation by S4 and a combat interpreters course by the civilian personnel office. Consideration is being given to the relocation of existing courses in an effort to make maximum use of our limited air transportation support. The establishment of a heavy weapons course is also being considered. In early March approval was received to conduct basic airborne training for non-airborne 5th SFGA personnel. Two regular courses were taught during the reporting period.

(2)(U) Dong Ba Thin Training Center.

(a) General. During the reporting period, Detachment B-51 continued to successfully accomplish its primary mission of providing advice and assistance to the VNSF Training Center in the training of VNSF and CIDG personnel. Advice and support were also rendered to the assigned Camp Strike Force in combat operations training and local security. Considerable improvements were made in the training support rendered, combat operations conducted, and in the quality of camp facilities provided for both USASF and CIDG personnel.

(b) Personnel Strength.

	<u>Det B-51</u>	<u>VNSF Training Center</u>	<u>Camp Strike Force</u>
AUTH:	9 Off/19 EM	49 Off/231 EM	480
ASGN:	9 Off/21 EM	51 Off/177 EM	480

(c) Operations. Combat operations were increased during the reporting period with 28 missions being executed. Notable successes were achieved in four joint operations conducted with units of the 30th ROK Regiment, 9th ROK Division. One of these operations was extremely successful and resulted in 14 VC KIA by the ROK forces. Similar operations of this nature will continue in the future.

(d) Training. Improvements in facilities were a major contribution to the increased effectiveness of training conducted. A three land Swing Landing Trainer was constructed for the basic airborne students. Two 100 point basic compass courses and a sevenbay student demolition and charge preparation bunker were constructed. The four inch thick plexiglass windows in each bay allow the students to observe their individual charges detonate. A multiurpose six-bay student firing bunker was also completed. From these bays the students are taught to use the M-79, light machine gun, M-72 LAW, 3.5" rocket launcher, 57 mm recoilless rifle, and hand grenades. Major renovation of other training aids are in progress. Reconstruction of the VC village, which was almost completely burned out by a fire in March, is one such project. Training center improvements scheduled to be completed during the next quarter include control towers for each of the three live fire ranges, a new "quick kill range," and two rappelling towers.

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(e) Results.

<u>COURSE</u>	<u>COMMENCED</u>	<u>GRADUATED</u>	<u>NO. STUDENTS</u>
Tae Kwon Do (Karate)	19 Feb 68	---	22
US Basic Airborne	19 Feb 68	25 Feb 68	1
VNSF Radio Operator	20 Nov 67	---	31
US Basic Airborne	12 Mar 68	16 Mar 68	6
Anti-tank and Combat in cities	14 Mar 68	22 Mar 68	22
US Basic Airborne	1 Apr 68	12 Apr 68	25
MSF Basic Airborne	3 Apr 68	11 Apr 68	149
Combat Recon Platoon	4 Apr 68	---	212
Infantry Tactics for VN Navy	28 Mar 68	11 Apr 68	41
CTDG Leadership	18 Apr 68	---	95
VNSF OFF/ACO/EM	18 Apr 68	---	89
US Basic Airborne	15 Apr 68	28 Apr 68	10
MSF Basic Airborne	15 Apr 68	27 Apr 68	186

(3)(u) MACV Recondo Schpol.

(a) General. During the reporting period MACV Recondo School continued its mission of training selected personnel from US/FWMAF units in the specialized techniques and skills necessary to conduct successful long range reconnaissance operations in South Vietnam. The MACV Recondo Museum, which was dedicated on 13 April 1968, was built by Sergeant Major Lynch and dedicated to his son, PFC Justin Lynch. PFC Lynch was killed in action in November 1965 at Plei Mei, RVN.

(b) Program of Instruction. The program of instruction consists of 286.5 hours of instruction over a 20 day period. Included are instructions on physical training, map reading, medical training, intelligence, patrolling, weapons training, air operations, and combat operations. The school has a capacity for sixty-five students per class.

(c) Cadre Strengths

AUTH: 5 Officers, 41 Enlisted.

ASGN: 7 Officers, 57 Enlisted.

(d) Results. During the quarter, MACV Recondo School trained eight Recondo classes, a total of 520 students. Graduating from these classes were 230 personnel.

(4)(u) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B).

(a) Detachment B-20 (MSF) graduated 156 recruits on 30 April in its first training course given to recruits organized as a company. This method proved superior to the previous technique of conducting the training on an individual basis after the recruit was assigned to a regular company.

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(b) All CIDG camps under the command of Detachment B-23 conducted refresher training during the past quarter. Basic training continues to be conducted at all camps. The 24th MSF company was recruited and given basic training.

(c) Training at the CIDG camps under the command of Detachment B-24 was conducted in tactics, weapons, and communications, personal hygiene and camp sanitation. Range firing of individual and crew-served weapons was conducted and the CSF were familiarized with CS agents.

(5)(u) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company A).

(a) The III CTZ CSF Training Center at Trang Sup has operated at full capacity throughout the quarter with a sustained average of 550-600 trainees.

(b) A training program for CSF 105 mm howitzer crews was initiated on 1 April. Progress to date has been slow; however, it is anticipated that the month of May will show a distinct improvement.

(c) Detachment B-35, Hau Nghia Province, initiated its own CSF refresher training course. The concept is to initially train one CSF company and one CRP. When this group graduates, another unit will take its place. The program of instruction includes instruction on the M-1 and M-2 carbine, M-1 Rifle, BAR, M-60 Machine gun, M-79 grenade launcher, 60 mm mortar, basic first aid, range firing, M-18 claymore mines, squad and platoon tactics, and basic communications with the HT-1, PRC-10, and PRC-25.

(d) As a result of the armor attack on Lang Vei and the confirmed presence of tanks within Special Forces TAOR's in III CTZ, a vigorous anti-tank training program was conducted. The program consisted of the formation of tank-killer teams, weapons familiarization, (106 mm RR, M-72 LAW, 3.5" rocket launcher and the 57 mm RR), instructions of tank capabilities and tactics, and field expedient means of destruction.

(6)(u) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D).

(a)(u) Plans are presently being made to conduct a two week refresher course for CSF companies at the new Te Chau Training Center in early May.

(b) Training in anti-tank warfare is being conducted at all detachments.

(c) Camp Strike Force leadership training continues as 32 students from subordinate detachments are presently attending this course at the Dong Ba Thia Training Center.

(d) The Mobile Strike Force Training Center at Don Phuc is presently conducting basic combat training for 139 recruits.

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f(4)Aviation. During the reporting period several new developments arose in the field of aviation.

(a) The forward air controller (FAC) support of Project Delta was increased by the introduction of the Twin engine O-2 aircraft as a substitute for the single engine O-1.

(b) A new idea has been developed in LAPES (Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System). The old method was capable of extracting bundles weighing 8,000 pounds. The newly modified techniques is able to extract up to 36,000 pounds on one pass.

(c) The 281st Assault Helicopter company has developed a new concept in armed helicopters. They have installed a M-6 system (four M-60 machine guns) which is fired by the co-pilot. Each door gunner now has a 40 mm Honeywell with 500 rounds of ammunition per gun as a replacement for the M-60 door guns. This gunnery system has proven to be quite successful.

g(4)Logistics.

(1) General. From 1 February through 30 April, the Logistical Support Center continued to provide the widely dispersed companies and detachments with all classes of supply and limited depot maintenance. During the period 13 - 18 April the final FY 69 budget was prepared and submitted to MACV.

(2) Supply (LSC). The ammunition stockage list was computed for the group and for each FSP. An extension is presently being built on Warehouse 2A to provide adequate space for a Self Service Supply Center for tools and expendables. A commercial type retail dispensing point for POL is nearly completed which will increase the efficiency of this operation.

(3) Movements and Storage. The ammunition storage area continues to be improved with the construction of over 700 feet of new berm and two fighting bunkers. During the reporting quarter, 12,223 short tons of supplies were moved from the LSC to supported FSP's and detachments.

(4) Maintenance. During the quarter, 1023 job orders for engineer equipment were received with 791 pieces of engineer equipment being repaired and 2162 being repaired. Four hundred and twenty-five automotive job orders were received with 489 vehicles being repaired.

(5) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B).

(a) The FSP at Pleiku continues to provide logistical support for two subordinate B detachments, 14 subordinate A detachments, and the Pleiku MSF.

(b) The FSP at Detachment B-23 (Ban Ma Thuot) became fully operational during the quarter and now provides logistical support for nine subordinate A

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detachments, the B detachment, and the MSF. It also handles specified items of supply for Detachment B-50.

(6) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company A).

(a) During the reporting period, the FSP shipped more cargo than during any previous period. Cargo shipped totaled 7,306,740 pounds in February, 4,050,111 pounds in March, and 6,076,110 pounds in April. This increase in operations can be attributed to the assignment of a C7A operation team to the Bien Hoa Airbase. This team has assisted Company A in proper scheduling and loading of supplies to the point where the output has increased by 30 percent.

(b) A vast construction program began in February to improve the facilities of the Company A S4 and the FSP. Thus far, the maintenance facilities store room, maintenance building and grease racks have been constructed. The foundations and frames for new office buildings, receiving sheds and warehouses are also complete. Once fully completed, the new S4 facilities will enable the Company A FSP and entire logistics control problem to be more efficiently controlled.

(7) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D).

(a) The amount of supplies handled by the Company D FSP during the reporting period increased approximately threefold as compared to the last period. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the increase in supplies moved took place with no appreciable increase in air assets. The fact that two camps were inserted during the quarter accounts for most of the increase in supplies moved.

(b) The logistical section of Company D continues to expand. A large amount of FSP was laid in order to increase open storage space. Already, after only a small amount of rainfall, the FSP has proven its value. Expansion into the new warehouse continues as more shelves and box pallets are built.

h. Revolutionary Development Support Activities and Psychological Operations.

(1) I CTZ.

(a) The sharp increase in Viet Cong activities during the Tet offensive resulted in floods of refugees and accompanying problems. Over 165,000 pounds of supplies were distributed to the 35,944 refugees that are presently being assisted by nine A detachments. In order to counter the propaganda produced by the enemy concerning the treatment of Hoi Chanh in the Chieu Hoi centers, Company C initiated a program to insure that no discrimination occurred against the Montagnard Hoi Chanh.

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(b) The training of POLWAR teams began during the latter part of March. A 16 man POLWAR team from Tra Bong participated in the training program which consisted of two weeks of classroom instruction and participation in a three day patrol during which they conducted loudspeaker operations and held discussions with all personnel contacted by the patrol. The two weeks of classroom work included 110 hours of theory and practical work.

(2) II CTZ.

(a) Civic action activities in Company B during the quarter involved refugee and resettlement aid, MEDCAP's, and distribution of commodities at all levels. A great deal of effort was directed toward the construction of CIDG dependent housing at Company B and Detachments B-20, B-23, A-244, A-236, A-242, and A-239. Upon approval from HQ 5th SFGA, construction of dependent housing will begin at Detachments B-22, A-231, A-235, and A-222. A CIDG memorial was established at Detachment A-237 and several camps are constructing either indoor or outdoor movie theaters for the CIDG Troops.

(b) Schools for the CIDG dependent children and civilian children were built in several camps. Detachments A-227, and A-228 are currently involved in major school construction programs.

(c) Although Tet created an influx of refugees to the urban areas, responsible GVN officials assumed control over the situation after initial assistance from the Special Forces detachments. Refugees supported solely by Special Forces rose from 4,500 in January to 19,500 in February. This number dropped to 1,450 by the end of March. Current refugee areas are Detachments A-239, A-246, A-224, and A-238. Phu Bon Province officials are taking over the programs at Detachments A-224 and A-238 and the province concerned with Detachments A-239 and A-246 is slowly lending a hand.

(d) The PSYOPS programs of Company B have been combined with the GVN POLWAR program quite successfully with the emphasis shifting naturally and easily from the civilian population toward the motivation and indoctrination of the CIDG soldier.

(e) PSYOPS programs have emphasized face-to-face media, the hand distribution of leaflets and posters. Leaflet dissemination dropped from 3.1 million in January to 300,000 in March, however, the reaction time for the few missions that have been requested has been reduced from several days to only a few hours.

(f) Several detachments are developing POLWAR teams and company B is presently planning to start a formal training program in June.

(3) III CTZ.

(a) MEDCAP's and the activities of the various POLWAR teams highlighted civic action activities in Company A. At the present, all PSYOPS and CIVAC



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programs being developed or already in operation are in support of the POLWAR program.

(b) Although CIDG POLWAR team have been organized in most camps since January, these teams have been virtually untrained and unmotivated. A POLWAR training course which consists of two weeks of formal classroom instruction and a one week FTX was initiated in April at the Trang Sup Special Forces Camp.

(c) PSYOPS material which is directed toward the CIDG and their dependents is currently being developed. This material will vary from handouts and posters to such specialized items as certificates of achievement and diplomas.

(L. IV CTZ.

(a) The main emphasis in civic actions at the beginning of the reporting period was the support for refugees. The massive influx of refugees, due to the Tet offensive, resulted in the immediate need for food, clothing and other CA commodities. Quick reaction from the SFOB, CARE, CRS, and other civilian agencies, helped tremendously in providing these people with the needed items. Under the protection offered by and with the help received from our detachments, the refugees have seen the advantages of the GVN.

(b) During the remainder of the reporting period, most detachments were involved in some sort of self help project. Construction on nine dependent housing projects and numerous other projects was at a peak throughout the Delta. Hopefully, most of the projects will be completed before the monsoons come in mid-May.

(c) The most significant setback of the Revolutionary Development program during this reporting period was caused by the Viet Cong offensive. Public offices, bridges, and aid stations were either burned or destroyed. The abandoning of the Binh Chau Outpost (Tuyen Binh Village) forced the civilian populace of Binh Chau Hamlet to leave their homes. District and Provincial officials aided these people in finding shelter with friends, relatives, and other villagers and provided them with emergency supplies of bulgar wheat, cooking oil, and canned meat.

(d) The majority of these people chose to become temporary refugees rather than stay in an area that the Viet Cong would control. The District Chief has also assured these people that GVN will do everything possible to help them return to their homes as soon as possible.

(e) Increased speaker operations in Detachment A-415 publicized the medical attention that was available at the district dispensary. The result was a 150% increase over January's number of patients.

(f) A CA/PSYOPS refresher training course was started on 25 March at the Cai Von training school near Can Tho. All Detachments sent one half of their CA/PSYOPS squad for the first four week course which terminated on 14 April. The remaining half began training during the last week in April.

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1. (U) Personnel.

(1) Strength. Authorized and assigned strength at the beginning and at the close of the reporting period were as follows:

(a) Beginning of Period:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Authorized:	691	24	2765	3480
Assigned:	577	23	2800	3400

(b) Close of Period:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Authorized:	691	24	2765	3480
Assigned:	639	23	2729	3391

(2) Replacements. During this quarter a total of 179 officers and 510 enlisted replacements were received. During the same period, the losses were 120 officers and 677 enlisted.

(3) Morale and Personnel Services.

(a) Decorations awarded:

Distinguished Service Cross	10
Silver Star	47
Distinguished Flying Cross	4
Legion of Merit	21
Soldier's Medal	17
Bronze Star w/"V" Device	201
Bronze Star	473
Air Medal w/"V" Device	14
Air Medal	223
Army Commendation Medal w/"V" Device	79
Army Commendation Medal	252
*Purple Heart	381

\* Does not include awards made for assigned personnel who were awarded the Purple Heart by hospitals.

(b) Combat Badges:

Combat Infantryman Badge	1062
Combat Medical Badge	215

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(4) Promotions. A total of 367 enlisted personnel were promoted during the period.

(5) Reenlistments. A total of 27 reenlistments or extension actions were completed. The enlistment/extension breakdown was:

First term RA reenlistments	12
AUS reenlistments	1
RA extensions	10
AUS extensions	3
USAR extensions	1

(6) Postal. The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) is serviced by APO 96240 and is responsible only for collection and distribution of mail.

(7) Special Services.

(a) R & R quotas received were 508 for out - of - country.

(b) A total of 18,038 persons attended the 91 different movies shown at the Special Forces Operational Base during the quarter.

(8) Chaplain Activities.

(a) Religious Services.

<u>Denomination</u>	<u>Nr of Services</u>	<u>Attendances</u>
Catholic	188	5406
Protestant	82	1700
Memorial	42	1702

(b) Visits. During the period, five chaplains made a total of 251 visits to Special Forces detachments located throughout Vietnam spending a total of 271 days in the field and 271 hours and 49 minutes flying time.

(c) There were 2,833 other personnel contacts (interviews, counseling, etc).

(9) Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order.

(a) A total of 141 incidents were reported to the Provost Marshal's office during the reporting period.

(b) Military Justice.

General Courts Martial	1
Special Courts Martial	0
Summary Courts Martial	1

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j(u)Medical.

(1) CIDG Medical Care.

(a) Construction was completed on the 40 bed expansion to the CIDG hospital at Da Nang during April 1968. This expansion to a capacity of 80 beds is already providing increased medical facilities for the treatment of I CTZ CIDG.

(b) During April 1968, construction began on a 40 bed CIDG convalescent center at Long Bai. This facility will permit CIDG long-term convalescence under medical supervision without decreasing available bed space at CIDG hospitals. The facility will further permit the retention in the CIDG program of personnel that require long-term convalescence as well as provide a location for rehabilitational and vocational training for disabled CIDG.

(2) Training.

(a) During the first quarter of 1968, 211 courses in personal hygiene and sanitation were conducted, attended by a total of 5,652 indigenous civilians.

(b) During the first quarter of 1968, Special Forces medical personnel trained 538 CIDG aidmen.

(c) During the first quarter of 1968, Special Forces medical personnel conducted the training of 137 civilian nurses who were hired to assist at CIDG dispensaries throughout the combat zone.

(3) Veterinary Medicine. During March and April 1968, approximately 900 water buffalo in I CTZ were immunized against rinderpest.

k(u)Signal.

(1) II CTZ. Detachment B-20 is in the process of constructing a communications center. Presently, all communications support is provided by Company B. Even after the completion of the communications center, it is anticipated that it will be a while before Detachment B-20 will be self-supporting.

(2) III CTZ. In order to provide for an efficient and reliable backup for the single-side band voice command net, an automatic FM retransmission facility was installed on Nui Ba Den mountain. This facility has made it possible for any camp to talk to almost any other in III CTZ by using either the AN/PRC-25 or AN/PRC-46 radio sets. FM communications have been improved to the extent that FM has become the primary means of communications between the B detachments and their respective subordinate A detachments. The installation of AN/VRC-46 and AN/VRC-47 radio sets at all detachments in III CTZ has made this possible.

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(3) IV CTZ. The installation of a Tropospheric Scatter System to Nha Trang was completed by the 52nd Signal Battalion during the reporting period. An agreement was reached with the 52nd Signal Battalion for passage of traffic from the 44th STZ to Detachments B-41 and B-42; however, this agreement terminates on 1 June 1968.

1.(5) Comptroller.

(1) Revision of Group Regulation 37-1. Due to the nature of Parasol SWITCHBACK funding, all cash control and accounting measures in use within the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) are self-imposed. The regulation imposing these measures is 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) Regulation 37-1. During the past quarter, Reg 37-1 has been evaluated and revised in an effort to provide clearer guidelines and more detailed instructions for detachment funds officers.

(2) Field Audit Program. The CIDG Finance Office completed a total of 52 on-site field audits during the past quarter. These field audits are conducted primarily for the purpose of assisting funds officers at operational detachments and advising them on proper methods of cash control and accounting procedures as well as to further impress upon them their responsibilities in regard to the large amounts of cash which they handle regularly. Field audits are performed in addition to monthly audits of all detachments fund reports performed at the CIDG Finance Office. Field audits are an integral part of the effort directed at overcoming the rapid turnover and general lack of previous financial experience among funds officers.

(3) FY 69 Command Budget Estimate. The preparation of the FY 69 Command Operating Budget marks the first time that the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) has attempted to develop and compile a complete Command Operating Budget. In the past, information was transmitted to USARPAC in the form of a five page FAX for development at that level. The FY 69 COB, a document in excess of 100 pages, is a product of exhaustive research and coordination among the staff section of this headquarters and U.S. Army CISO. In-Country and Out-of-Country QMA and PEMA were staff developed by total cost and quarterly cost and were complete with category and line item justifications.

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(m)(c) Engineer.

(1) The following new CIDG camp construction and rehabilitation construction was conducted during the reporting period (asterisk denotes rehabilitation construction):

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>CONST UNIT</u>	<u>% COMPLETE</u>	<u>EST DATE COMPLETION</u>
<u>II CTZ:</u>			
Tieu Atar, A-231	KB 1/20th EBC	100%	
Ben Het, (Undesignated)	KB 4/299th EBC	80%	UNK
*Plateau Gi, A-243	KB 4	80%	20 May
Binh Thanh, A-502	Staff Engr	100%	
*Dak Pek, A-242	299th EBC	75%	15 May
Ban Me Thuot, B-50	KB 3	80%	15 Jun
Pleiku, B Company	Staff Engr	---	---

## III CTZ:

Kantum, A-322	588th EBC/A-322	98%	30 May
Thien Ngon, A-323	588th EBC/A-323	98%	30 May
Duc Hue, A-351	30th EBC (ARVN)	90%	UNK
*Tong Le Chon, A-334	KB 2	25%	UNK
Bu Dop, A-341	Staff Engr/A-341	40%	UNK
*Tra Cu, A-352	A-352 (selfhelp)	50%	30 Jun
Tay Ninh, B-32	B-32 (selfhelp)	90%	15 Jun
Hon Quan, B-33	B-33 (selfhelp)	60%	10 Jul
Song Be, B-34	B-33 (selfhelp)	95%	10 May
Long Hai, B-36	B-36/A-302	70%	30 Jun

## IV CTZ:

Thanh Tri, A-414	KB 1	65%	31 May
My Dien II, A-416	KB 2/A-416	90%	31 May
Can Tho, B-40	Staff Engr	30%	30 Jun
Can Tho, Company D	Staff Engr	40%	31 May

(2) The following construction projects are planned during the next quarters:

<u>LOCATION:</u>	<u>CONST UNIT</u>	<u>EST START</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Minh Thanh	KB 2	UNK	Rehabilitation after Tong Le Choa.
Tra Cu, A-352	KB 2	UNK	Rehabilitation after Minh Tanh
Tra Cu Air Field	20th Engr Bde	15 May	
Duc Hue Air Field, A-351	20th Engr Bde	1 Jun	
Moc Hoa, B-41 (MSF)	Staff Engr	15 May	Rehabilitate old A-414 camp
Can Tho, Company D HQ	Staff Engr	1 Jun	

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(3) In addition to the construction projects conducted in the subordinate detachments approximately 50 projects were conducted within the SFOB (including A-502, A-503, and B-52). About one half of the projects were completed during the quarter while the remainder are still in progress. During the quarter well drilling operations in II CTZ resulted in two wells drilled at Pleiku and two at Qui Nhon.

(4) Well drilling operations in III CTZ resulted in three dry holes. Problems were encountered at 100 to 120 foot depths where rock stratum prevents further penetrations. After the arrival of necessary drill collars and hard rock drill bits from CONUS, the three wells can be completed. In the meantime, the well drilling team is moving to Tay Ninh where it is hoped the rock stratum is below the water table.

(5) Status of CAC 906 Funds. As of this report \$1,532,755 or 77% of FY 68 budgeted construction funds have been obligated, of this amount, \$836,838 or 55% has been expended, \$695,915 has been obligated but not yet expended and \$467,245 budgeted but not yet obligated. At present there are planned projects that will require approximately \$225,000 of the remaining unobligated funds.

(6) Analysis. Engineer activities during the period shifted away from new CIDG camps construction toward rehabilitation projects. Also, the Group continued to have limited success in obtaining regular engineer support from units outside 5th SFGA. The main problem with outside support is that it is provided on an "as available" basis. Construction equipment utilization continues to suffer from lack of qualified operators. The equipment available is in great demand, but whenever it is loaned out to detachments other than KB teams it is invariably inoperative within a short time, usually without accomplishing the mission for which it was sent.

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2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations,  
and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) Paragraphing Format, AR 340-15.

(Historian)

OBSERVATION: The method of indentation of subordinate paragraphs as required by AR 340-15 is confusing and makes interpretation more difficult.

EVALUATION: AR 340-15 requires all subordinate paragraphs to begin four spaces from the left margin. It has been found that lengthy correspondence often includes many subdivisions under main paragraphs, for example the lessons learned portion of the Operational Report-Lessons Learned. By indenting all subdivisions the same number of spaces from the left margin, it becomes extremely difficult to visually detect one subordinate idea from another and relate them in proper perspective to the main idea. For that reason this headquarters elected not to number "OBSERVATION", "EVALUATION", and "RECOMMENDATION" as subordinate paragraphs as outlined in USARV Reg 525-15.

RECOMMENDATION: That the correspondence format as outlined in AR 340-15 be changed to allow for some differentiation in identification for each subdivision of a paragraph.

(2) Personnel Rosters.

(Company A)

OBSERVATION: B detachments should publish personnel information rosters and update them on a recurring basis.

EVALUATION: Some detachments had previously neglected to publish or maintain a current personnel information roster. Once the practice was initiated, it was found that improved casualty report and replacement systems were a direct result. Changes to the roster may be included in daily administrative reports.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(3) Identification Tags and Cards.

(Company A)

OBSERVATION: It is imperative that the senior US person on site inspect US personnel just prior to operations to insure that identification tags and cards are in their possession.

EVALUATION: Recent casualties have been evacuated without identification tags and cards accompanying their bodies. Even though personnel have been directed to carry these items, they continue to leave on operations without them.

RECOMMENDATION: None.



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(4) Recurring Reports and Routine Requests.

(Company D)

OBSERVATION: Recurring reports were being received from the detachments in varying formats and sometimes incomplete. Reports on routine requests also required an excessive amount of typing at the "A" detachment.

EVALUATION: It has been found that by stenciling a number of forms and distributing them to the detachments, a number of items such as R&R requests, form indorsements, VIP visit reports, and pay complaints could be completed with a minimum of typing or even by hand. This assured uniformity, completeness, more rapid response, and a reduced administrative burden to the detachments.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(5) Tracing of Awards and Decorations.

(Company A)

OBSERVATION: Monthly liaison visits to the SFOB have proven to be highly effective in insuring an efficient awards and decorations program.

EVALUATION: It has been found that correspondence alone was an insufficient and time consuming means of tracing recommendations for awards. Monthly liaison visits afford the opportunity to physically trace recommendations and coordinate on problem areas or changes in requirements.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(6) Motion Picture Projectors.

(Company A)

OBSERVATION: One or two extra motion picture projectors should be maintained at the C detachment to allow for a direct exchange system with the A detachments. The responsibility for DX repair should rest with the C detachment signal officer.

EVALUATION: Motion picture projectors at the A detachments are subject to extreme conditions and therefore breakdown at a higher rate than is normally the case at the B or C detachment. A DX repair system is necessary to insure that the detachments can continue to see movies while projectors are being repaired.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(7) CIDG Morale.

(Company B)

OBSERVATION: A system should be established which would give CIDG personnel absent from the camp a means of forwarding money to their dependents through the pay officer and the CIDG secretary. Letters and packages to the CIDG from his family could be delivered by the CIDG secretary in the same manner.

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EVALUATION: It has been found that when CIDG personnel operate away from their camp and family for an extended period of time, their greatest concerns are for the welfare of their dependents and the inability to receive news from home. These concerns often take precedence over the combat operations which they are conducting, especially on payday.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

### (8) Requirements for Special Forces Aidmen.

(Surgeon)

OBSERVATION: The requirement for medical aidmen in the 5th Special Forces Group far exceeds the authorization.

EVALUATION: The expansion of Mobile Strike Forces, the expansion of CIDG hospitals and increases in CIDG hospital activities, and the expansion of medical training programs have increased the requirements for medical aidmen in the 5th Special Forces Group far above the authorized strength of 236 aidmen.

RECOMMENDATION: That all aidmen assigned to this organization in excess of authorization be kept in the Group to successfully accomplish the medical mission for which this unit is responsible other than being levied by higher headquarters for non-Special Forces missions.

### b. Operations.

#### (1) VC Diversionary Tactics.

(Company B)

OBSERVATION: Small size reconnaissance patrols should be used to verify intelligence reports prior to reacting in force.

EVALUATION: The VC often attempt to draw attention from the major infiltration routes to other areas by means of small unit activities and/or false intelligence reports.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

#### (2) Searching Captured Sampans.

(Company D)

OBSERVATION: Captured enemy sampans should be thoroughly searched, to include the bottom side, prior to their destruction.

EVALUATION: It has been found that most operations do not have the capability to return captured sampans to base camp; subsequently, they are destroyed. Searches of these sampans have often yielded hidden equipment and supplies. A favorite procedure of the VC is to secure items to the bottom of a sampan.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

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## (3) Airboat Utilization and Preparations.

(Company D)

OBSERVATION: Lessons learned during the previous airboat season have helped in providing valuable guidance to subordinate headquarters with regards to airboat tactics, communications, and resupply.

EVALUATION: Airboats work best when employed with gunships. The gunships locate, isolate, and engage the target. The airboat section provides the maneuver elements to seal off any escape routes. The built-in speed and maneuverability of the airboat require constant observation by either VR or FAC aircraft. Without guidance from above, the airboat section may easily become disoriented.

RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

(4) Obtaining Tactical Air Support.

(Aviation)

OBSERVATION: Interviews with several US Air Force forward air controllers (FAC) and tactical air control party commanders have revealed that there is a definite lack of knowledge by US Army forces in the proper method of obtaining tactical air support.

EVALUATION: Conventional ground units in RVN are not affected by this lack of knowledge as much as Special Forces units, because there are air liaison officers attached at brigade and higher level. Forward air controllers are attached at battalion level. No provision has been made in the 5th Special Forces Group for this type of support except in the case of certain special operations. This leaves, for the most part, all of the Special Forces detachments with neither the capability nor the knowledge to properly request tactical air support. HQ 5th SFGA is presently coordinating with the US Air Force on the attachment of an air liaison officer for each of the four Special Forces company headquarters. This officer would give the company the capability of receiving more responsive and more effective tactical air support.

RECOMMENDATION: That courses of instruction on the proper methods and channels for requesting tactical air support be included in the various US Army School curriculums. This instruction should touch lightly on the organizational structure of the US Air Force so as to familiarize the ground commander with US Air Force techniques and procedures. It would be desirable to have US Air Force personnel with air ground operational experience in RVN as instructors.

(5) VC Caches.

(Company D)

OBSERVATION: Raids on known enemy way stations produce better results than attempts to ambush the VC carrying parties shortly after they cross the Cambodian border.

EVALUATION: Supplies are being infiltrated via canals and trails to preselected supply points located at considerable distance from the Cambodian border in IV CTZ. Raids on these locations by quick reaction helicopter forces (Delta Falcon Operations) has proven to be highly successful.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

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(6) Rearming of AH-1G Cobras.

(Company D)

OBSERVATION: It has been noted that the major limiting factor in the employment of the AH-1G Cobra is the delay involved in arming between missions.

EVALUATION: To cut down on the "downtime" required to rearm Cobras, permanent ammunition storage/rearming points have been constructed in the vicinity of the aircraft refueling points. Three 55 gallon POL drums have been modified and emplaced to store 2.75 inch rockets. Semi-permanent containers have been constructed for pre-linked 7.62 mm.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(7) Reconnaissance of Heliborne Landing Zones.

(Company A)

OBSERVATION: Reconnaissances of landing zones must be thorough so as to prevent last minute radical changes. The recon party should make high passes over the LZ area to insure accurate map spotting. At least one low pass should be made to check size, obstacles, slope, and general suitability. Reconnaissance of additional LZ's must be conducted in order to prevent compromise of the perspective LZ.

EVALUATION: Heliborne operations have often been disrupted by last second changes in landing formation, technique, and even in the location of the LZ itself. These changes lengthen the time of exposure to enemy fire, reduce the effectiveness of surprise and landing zone preparations, and in general jeopardize the success of the mission.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(8) Marking of Friendly Positions.

(Company A)

OBSERVATION: A committed element which is requesting tactical air support must mark at least three points so that its location is completely defined and the FAC can adjust air strikes safely.

EVALUATION: An element in contact was able to mark only its center of mass for the FAC who was controlling the air strikes. The exact location of the friendly element could not be determined; therefore, it was impossible to place air strikes as close to the friendly troops as was desired.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(9) Marking Friendly Troop Positions.

(Company B)

OBSERVATION: USAF signal mirrors may be utilized effectively to identify friendly troop positions to FAC's.

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EVALUATION: Fixing friendly troop positions by use of smoke can sometimes prove to be a problem when the enemy also uses smoke or adjusts his fire on the friendly smoke. Under sunlight conditions USAF signal mirrors have been utilized to quickly fix friendly positions with aircraft maneuvering at a considerable distance and without revealing friendly positions to the enemy. Panels may be deployed after the initial fix with the mirrors.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(10) Utilization of Smoke Grenades by CSF Personnel. (Company A)

OBSERVATION: CSF troops should not be allowed the prerogative of throwing smoke without control. If CSF are allowed to carry smoke grenades they should be instructed on the proper method of affixing the grenade to their webbing.

EVALUATION: The activation of a smoke grenade by a CSF soldier at the same time a USASF advisor is attempting to fix the enemy location with smoke can result in disaster. Valuable time may be lost trying to describe to the supporting aircraft which smoke was the actual reference point. Improper employment of smoke could also result in airstrikes being placed on friendly elements.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(11) Effectiveness of the M-26 Fragmentation Grenade. (Company A)

OBSERVATION: The white phosphorous grenade is more effective than the M-26 fragmentation grenade in swampy terrain.

EVALUATION: It has been found that water and mud have a deadening effect on the M-26 grenade and cause the majority of the shrapnel to travel vertically rather than horizontally. The mushrooming dispersion pattern of the white phosphorous grenade makes it a more desirable weapon for use in swampy areas.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(12) Method of Firing the AN-M43Q2 aircraft Illumination Cartridge. (Company B)

OBSERVATION: The AN-M43Q2 aircraft illumination cartridge (normally fired from a flare pistol) can be fired from an M-79 grenade launcher.

EVALUATION: None.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

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
## (13) Field Expedient Alarm Device.

(Company C)

OBSERVATION: Many times the enemy enters a village during the night to harass the villagers. By utilizing an alarm device, villagers can alert friendly forces near the village.

EVALUATION: A simple early warning device can easily be constructed out of readily available materials as shown in the diagram below. Due to the delay feature of this device, the villager can warn friendly troops of enemy presence without compromising his own position.

### EARLY WARNING DEVICE



RECOMMENDATION: None.

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## (14) Use of Captured Enemy Ordnance.

(Company A)

OBSERVATION: An effective complement to or substitute for a claymore mine can be made by packing the fuze well of an 82 mm mortar round with C4 composition and using a claymore firing device as a detonator.

EVALUATION: None.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

## (15) Conduct of Operation Utilizing CSF Not Indigenous to the TAOR. (Company A)

OBSERVATION: When a new CIDG camp is opened and its CSF troops are not indigenous to the TAOR, the initial operations should be conducted close to the camp. Gradually the CSF will become familiar with the terrain and gain confidence and experience as the operations extend further from the camp.

EVALUATION: CSF who are indigenous to their TAOR are familiar with the terrain in the area. They are on equal footing with the VC who have occupied the area for years and know every trail and clearing. At some Special Forces camps recently constructed, the CSF have been recruited from other areas. Because of their inexperience and unfamiliarity with the TAOR, they are initially at a large disadvantage. This disadvantage must be considered when planning and conducting operations.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

## (16) Timeframes for Arclight Clearance.

(Company A)

OBSERVATION: Requests for Arclight clearance have at times severely restricted ground operations from CIDG camps.

EVALUATION: Nearly all arclight requests are for 30 day periods. Although a 24 hour advance warning is given prior to the actual strike, detachments are reluctant to commit troops to the strike zone during the clearance period. A delay or breakdown in communications could result in annihilation of the entire patrol. During the clearance period, all interdiction efforts by ground elements cease and the VC/NVA forces have free run of that portion of the TAOR.

RECOMMENDATION: That the timeframe for arclight clearances be reduced to a shorter period, ie...seven days. This timeframe would allow sufficient time to analyze intelligence and expand the ordnance without being deleterious to ground operations.

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## (17) Operations along Enemy Supply Routes.

(Company A)

OBSERVATION: Enemy construction and security parties along enemy roads are particularly vulnerable to allied operations.

EVALUATION: Due to increased resupply requirements created by their more frequent use of large caliber mortars and rockets, the enemy has had to build and improve his lines of communication. Small unit ambushes conducted against construction crews and security elements have provided good results.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

## (18) Employment of Claymore Mines in Ambushes.

(Company B)

OBSERVATION: When an ambush is set up, claymore mines should be arranged not only to effectively cover troops within the killing zone, but also to cover troops not yet in the killing zone. This may be achieved by facing the claymore down the length of the trail.

EVALUATION: Inexperienced troops often spring an ambush prematurely by firing before the enemy force is entirely within the killing zone. Claymores positioned at either end of the killing zone can effectively compensate for the premature keying of an ambush.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

## (19) Area Ambushes.

(Company B)

OBSERVATION: It has been found that best results from area ambushes are obtained when elements are dispersed in a minimum of three ambush positions over a distance of at least 1500 meters. Troops manning the ambush positions should be rotated to prevent fatigue and restlessness. It has also been observed that the NVA will continue to use infiltration routes, even after numerous contacts, because of inadequate communications.

EVALUATION: None.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

## (20) Ambush versus Movement.

(Company A)

OBSERVATION: Rather than spending the entire day moving through an operational area, it is often more profitable for the unit to periodically stop and set up ambushes for several hours along well traveled paths and trails.

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EVALUATION: It has been found that the majority of VC kills have been obtained when the VC were moving and the CSF were in stationary positions, either ambush or RON. Conversely, the greatest number of friendly casualties occurred when the friendly troops were moving and the VC were in a static position.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(21) Use of CSF for Security.

(Company A)

OBSERVATION: Camp Strike Forces soldiers are not suited for static security missions either by inclination or organization.

EVALUATION: Camp Strike Force soldiers have been tasked with the responsibility of providing security for US units. One US artillery FSB, for which a CSF unit had the security mission, had to be moved eventually because of the difficulties encountered in keeping the CLDG from going AWOL at will. US unit commanders generally do not understand that the USASF are advisors to the VNSF and that the USASF cannot issue orders to the CSF and have them immediately carried out. In a road security type mission, they have neither the communications, mobility, or responsiveness to rapidly react.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(22) Contact Between USASF and VNSF During Operations.

(Company A)

OBSERVATION: It is imperative that the USASF and VNSF remain in physical contact at all times during operations, especially during contact with the enemy. The practice of having the same USASF and VNSF participate together on operations as frequently as possible would help them to estimate more accurately how the other will react in any given situation.

EVALUATION: Recently, an element made contact with the VC; the USASF and VNSF became split during the subsequent maneuvering. The VNSF subsequently became surrounded and could not receive any outside support due to the absence of US communications at the scene of the action.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(23) Carrying of the PRC-25 Radio on Combat Operations.

(Company A)

OBSERVATION: The PRC-25 radio should be carried on jungle operations inside a rucksack with the short antenna (still attached to the radio) folded alongside the radio inside the rucksack. The radio and antenna are protected from damage and are concealed from the enemy observation.

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EVALUATION: It has been found that damage results to PRC-25 radios and antennas when the radio is carried on the standard radio packboard during movement through heavy jungle. The radio, when exposed to view, is also a primary target for enemy fire.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

## (24) Improved Firing Charts for CIDG Camp Mortars. (Company A)

OBSERVATION: Accurate map data for use in computing data for the camp mortar fires may be obtained from aerial photos of the camp and surrounding area.

EVALUATION: Topographical maps do not depict the construction of CIDG camps and the associated housing or villages nearby. A recent aerial photograph will clearly show all terrain features and new structures. It also will provide a rapid means of locating targets for untrained observers. An azimuth index on the photo and range scale can easily be established by means of azimuth line and distance between two known points.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

## (25) USASF Inspection of CSF Personnel. (Company A)

OBSERVATION: USASF advisors and their VNSF counterparts must inspect CSF troops prior to every operation in order to insure that they are prepared for the rigors and eventualities of combat.

EVALUATION: CSF personnel will often depart on operations with no water in their canteens, thinking they will find water along the way. Also, in order to lighten their load, the CSF will depart with 1/4 the amount of ammunition required. To insure that no deficiencies are overlooked, USASF personnel must assist the VNSF in pre-operation inspections.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

## (26) CIDG Chain of Command. (Company B)

OBSERVATION: Increased utilization of the CIDG chain of command will develop more responsible CIDG and free the USASF and VNSF for more important jobs.

EVALUATION: Discussion and planning between the USASF and VNSF sometimes result in the complete exclusion of the CIDG, even to the point that orders are issued directly to the CIDG soldier concerned rather than through the CIDG chain of command. This results in an ineffective span of control. USASF and VNSF are then forced to personally supervise many details in order to insure continued progress. The ranking CIDG should be recognized as the supervisor, given the proper instructions, and then periodically checked.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

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c. Training.(1) Construction of Airborne Training Apparatus.

(Det B-51)

OBSERVATION: While planning and constructing a Swing Landing Trainer, a basic training apparatus used in airborne training, it was found that TM 57-220, Technical Training of the Parachutist, gave insufficient dimensions for proper and safe construction of the training aid.

EVALUATION: Other than for the material in TM 57-220, no other publication is readily available which gives guidance in the construction of training apparatus used in airborne training. Professional written guidance is necessary to enable both US and foreign training centers to properly construct these essential training aids so that when completed they are safe and easy to maintain.

RECOMMENDATION: That TM 57-220 be revised, or an additional manual be published, to include detailed guidance, complete blueprints, and a list of building materials required for the construction of airborne training apparatus.

(2) Training of O5B (Radio Operator) Replacement Personnel. (Company A)

OBSERVATION: Newly assigned O5B (Radio Operators) replacement personnel are arriving from CONUS insufficiently trained to assume their duties. More specifically, these personnel are not familiar with the KWM-2A and the AN/PRC-74. In addition they cannot send or receive CW fast enough to pass traffic.

EVALUATION: None.

RECOMMENDATION: That a quality control program be instituted at the Special Warfare Training Center at Fort Bragg. Under this program all operators should be tested on each piece of equipment found in an A detachment. Those not familiar with the equipment should be recycled through the training in the areas in which weaknesses are shown.

(3) Realistic Training in Quick Reaction Firing.

(Company B)

OBSERVATION: Firing at fixed targets appearing at constant ranges is a fine method for training CSF soldiers in basic marksmanship, but such conditions are artificial for conditions of close jungle combat. A more realistic range for quick reaction firing should be established.

EVALUATION: A realistic range for quick reaction firing can be established along a section of a trail. Silhouette type targets can be fastened to the hinged lid of 4.2" mortar ammo boxes so that they can be remotely swung into view by lane coaches with lengths of wire. This type of range has proven effective in developing close controlled fire at specified targets and diminished the tendency of strikers to empty their magazines during the initial burst of fire.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

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## d. Intelligence.

### (1) VC Infiltration into the CIDG.

(Company C)

OBSERVATION: The VC are using the CIDG recruiting programs as means for infiltrating agents into the CIDG. Mass recruitment of personnel into the CIDG should be avoided.

EVALUATION: Investigation following a recent attack on a CSF outpost revealed that several VC had infiltrated the ranks of the CIDG. Further interrogation of captured suspects revealed that a number of local VC infiltrated into the CIDG camp through the camp's mass recruitment program conducted in December 1967. A total of 27 actual or suspected VC infiltrators were subsequently apprehended. Recruiting in smaller numbers would have allowed more thorough security checks of personnel.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

### (2) Detecting VC Infiltrators Among the CIDG.

(Company C)

OBSERVATION: Unannounced alerts or simulated attacks have proven successful in causing VC infiltration agents to give themselves away prematurely.

EVALUATION: During unannounced alerts, careful observation of the CIDG may reveal some conspicuous act that will identify any VC infiltrators. In one case, the VC agents within the camp were to tie a handkerchief to their right wrist when the camp came under attack.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

### (3) Records Pertaining to Intelligence Agents.

(Company B)

OBSERVATION: Accurate records pertaining to agents must be maintained in order to insure the smooth transition between departing USASF intelligence personnel and their replacements. These records must not only identify the agents but also give background on the effectiveness and reliability of the agent.

EVALUATION: A rapid turnover in intelligence personnel due to casualties and end of tour transfers recently occurred in an A detachment. There was no overlap period to allow new personnel to acquire the personal knowledge held by their predecessor and the detachment found itself in a position in which the effectiveness and identity of some agents was unknown. No records had been maintained to preserve this information.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

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### (4) Use of Cameras to Record Intelligence.

(Company A)

OBSERVATION: Intelligence gained from the use of hand held cameras on combat operations is invaluable and this intelligence gathering medium should be utilized more often.

EVALUATION: During a debriefing following an operation in which three enemy vehicles were destroyed, no one was able to identify or describe any vital characteristics of the vehicles. A photograph of the vehicles would have recorded this information. Photographs of base camps, trails, enemy positions, etc. accompanied by their six digit coordinate locations on the map would provide unquestionably valuable intelligence. Each operational A detachment is authorized one Pen EE and one Polaroid camera for this purpose.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

### (5) Dissemination of Intelligence.

(Company A)

OBSERVATION: An effective and rapid method of disseminating intelligence can be gained through the lateral exchange of B detachment INTSUMS and intelligence spot reports.

EVALUATION: Due to the close proximity of certain operational A detachments under the control of different B detachments and the high degree of mobility demonstrated by enemy Main Force units, it is imperative that A detachments be kept informed of the enemy situation in the adjacent areas.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

### (6) Dissemination of SLAR Readouts.

(Company A)

OBSERVATION: The value of intelligence gained by airborne sensors is increased by the rapid dissemination of inflight readouts.

EVALUATION: It is most important that SLAR readouts be expeditiously dispatched to the B Detachments in whose areas enemy activity has been noted. Inflight readouts can be transmitted from the aircraft to the appropriate Field Force G2 Air, to the Special Forces Company, and then to the respective B and A detachments in approximately 10-15 minutes after the initial sighting. Operations in the field can then be notified and react immediately to enemy activity detected in their area.

RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

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e. Logistics.

(1) Damage to 10 KW Generators.

(SL)

OBSERVATION: It has been found that a slight modification of 10 KW generator engines has significantly reduced engine failures.

EVALUATION: Fifty 10 KW diesel engine driven generators were distributed throughout the II Corps area. Constant vibration of the oil cooler, mounted on the radiator core, caused the joints of the inlet and outlet oil lines to crack at the joints. Thus the oil was pumped out and caused the engine to burn up. Eight engine failures occurred in this manner within a five day period. The engines were modified by running a direct return line from the oil filter to the oil pan, by passing the oil cooler. There were no further engine failures from the above mentioned deficiency.

RECOMMENDATION: That new equipment be closely observed during the first few days after it has been placed in operation. Despite thorough testing at the factory, "bugs" sometimes develop while operating under field conditions. If malfunctions which could permanently damage the equipment begin to appear, operation of the machinery should cease until technically qualified personnel has had an opportunity to examine the item.

2) Use of Propane Gas in Lieu of Acetylene.

(Company A)

OBSERVATION: Propane should be used in lieu of acetylene only in emergency situations and then for only short periods of time.

EVALUATION: The unavailability of acetylene has resulted in a loss of construction time at CIDG camps as well as at the FSP. It was found that propane or butane can be used if cutting must be done, but that its use for prolonged periods tends to ruin the cutting torch tip. Propane is also more dangerous than acetylene.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(3) Fire Breaks in Storage Areas.

(Company A)

OBSERVATION: Fire Breaks should be created when stockpiling materials. Space should be left in storage areas to permit fire fighting equipment to enter. Piles of lumber should be broken by intervals of space or by some type of non-combustible material to keep any fires combined to one area.

EVALUATION: A fire caused by 122 mm rocket fire destroyed much lumber and equipment in a FSP storage yard. Much material had to be moved in order for fire trucks to gain access to the fire. Many combustible materials had to be moved to prevent their catching on fire. The presence of fire breaks in the storage area would have minimized damage and facilitated extinguishing the fire.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

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(4) Storage of Lumber.

(Company A)

OBSERVATION: When it is necessary to store large amounts of lumber that will not be shipped out immediately, extra high dunnage should be used for the bottom pallet to prevent the bottom lumber from being soaked during the rainy season.

EVALUATION: None.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(5) Issue of CIDG Uniforms.

(Company B)

OBSERVATION: CIDG soldiers should not be issued new clothing without direct exchange for his old clothing. Old clothing should be repaired for reissue or destroyed.

EVALUATION: It has been reported that VC have been sighted wearing tiger fatigues and bata boots. Also, many civilians possess either parts of or entire tiger fatigue uniforms because of failure to account for old articles of clothing prior to issuing new clothing to CIDG soldier.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(6) Over Extension of Assets.

(Company A)

OBSERVATION: When planning construction efforts involving large amounts of material and air movement assets, it is essential that adequate means and supervisory personnel are made available before beginning the project.

EVALUATION: One B Detachment recently had the responsibility for supporting the simultaneous construction of two Special Forces CIDG camps and a B detachment compound. Due to lack of sufficient personnel, materials, and air movement assets, one or more of these construction efforts periodically fell behind schedule. Temporary augmentation of personnel to the B detachment S4 section would have alleviated the personnel shortages.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(7) Preparation of CONEX Containers for Use as Bunkers.

(Company A)

OBSERVATION: Unserviceable CONEX containers make suitable bunkers until more substantial structures can be built; however, the preparation of the CONEX container, to include the cutting of firing ports, should be accomplished prior to delivery to the CIDG camp site.

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EVALUATION: At two recently opened CIDG camps, CONEX containers were utilized as machinegun bunkers. Several of these containers arrived on site without firing ports already cut and oxygen, acetylene, and cutting torches had to be delivered in order that ports could be cut. An already heavy workload on the detachment was unnecessarily increased.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(8) 1528 Low Altitude Parachute Extraction Delivery System (LAPES). (Company D)

OBSERVATION: The 1528 LAPES system has proved to be a highly effective method of delivering large amounts of barrier and construction material in a short period of time.

EVALUATION: After a camp site has been secured and is ready to receive initial deliveries of construction and barrier material, a delivery system which is capable of delivering large payloads in a short time is an absolute necessity. The 1528 LAPES system was satisfactorily used to deliver 35,000 lb loads of these materials to a new CIDG camp site. The terrain was suitable for the use of this system and the accuracy and recovery rate of materials was excellent.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(9) Substitute Building Material.

(Company B)

OBSERVATION: When other materials such as tin or wire screen are unavailable, woven bamboo matting provides an excellent substitute material to use in false roofs which are built over bunkers to predetonate mortar rounds.

EVALUATION: None.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

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f. Organization. None.

g. Other.

(1) Psychological Impact of Tet Offensive. (S5)

OBSERVATION: The actions of the CIDG (Montagnard) soldiers during the Tet offensive were praised by Vietnamese people from all levels of society. This rapport between normally hostile groups (Vietnamese and Montagnard) should be exploited and nurtured in an effort to close the wide gap in understanding and cooperation between the groups.

EVALUATION: Many CIDG units are credited with saving various cities and areas from enemy occupation and control during the Tet period. At the present time, the CIDG soldier is accorded a higher degree of respect than ever before. This is a major psychological achievement, especially where Montagnard CIDG were employed in areas in which the population is primarily ethnic Vietnamese. Soldiers who participated in the defense of an area should be encouraged to visit the area again. The unit, which was engaged in combat and the possible destruction of a given area, should offer to help the people rebuild their homes whenever possible.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(2) Civic Action Support for Refugees. (S5)

OBSERVATION: Each Special Forces CIDG camp should have a definite plan to provide for refugees within their capability, but should also have contingency plans to quickly seek outside help when their limit is reached. Each District and Province has funds available for refugee assistance in emergency situations and all US Volunteer Agencies have some supplies stockpiled to absorb the initial impact of unexpected refugees.

EVALUATION: Immediately following the attacks on the major cities during Tet, many thousands of people were temporarily destitute and turned to Special Forces camps for assistance. Most Special Forces camps are prepared at all times to handle a limited number of refugees for short periods of time; however, the number of people involved during Tet greatly exceeded the capability of the camps to adequately care for the refugees. Many camps still tried to provide for the refugees from their own resources and did not ask for help from GVN or Volunteer Agencies. Many refugees received little or no care or assistance.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period  
Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65(RI) (U)

15 May 1968

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(3) Long Range Civic Action Projects.

(S5)

OBSERVATION: In addition to high impact, short range civic action projects, each area in South Vietnam needs long range programs planned to bolster the favorable GVN image created by the short range programs. These long range plans should always be formulated in a way to bring the people being assisted into the activities. These should be self-help programs whenever possible.

EVALUATION: Throughout the Republic of Vietnam, the majority of Civic Action projects being planned or conducted seem to be those designed to quickly impress the people of a given area with the sincere desire of GVN to assist them. These short range, high impact projects are quite useful in areas where the allegiance of the population is questionable, or where the people have expressed a desire for help in a specific area. But as a general rule, if an image is quickly created, it tends to be quickly forgotten.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(4) Effectiveness of Loudspeakers Versus Leaflets in PSYOPS. (Company A)

OBSERVATION: In some instances loudspeaker broadcast are more successful in inducing the enemy to rally than are leaflets. The broadcast should be area oriented and should name specific places to which the enemy who desires to rally may go.

EVALUATION: Interrogation of several VC who rallied to the GVN at Special Forces camps reveals that the VC have an intense anti-leaflet campaign to diminish the efforts of the US/GVN PSYOPS campaign. There are heavy penalties for VC who are caught with leaflets in their possession. They have not, however, prevented the VC from listening to aerial broadcasts.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(5) Utilization of PSYOP Aircraft.

(S5)

OBSERVATION: Most areas in the RVN have PSYOPS aircraft with night flying capabilities. These aircraft can be used as a weapon in much the same manner that H & I fire is utilized.

EVALUATION: Most Special Forces detachments request and utilize PSYOPS aircraft only when they are in definite contact with an enemy unit, or only when they desire an appeal directed at a small specific group. When intelligence sources indicate a probable location of enemy troops, a night speaker mission covering the entire general area should be requested. These "no doze" missions will create the impression that we possess "hard" intelligence about the location of the unit, and at the same time, provide harassment by possible keeping the enemy awake. The aircraft does not need specific messages to broadcast. Many types of music are unnerving when heard at night and tapes of irritating noises can easily be produced locally.

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RECOMMENDATION: None.

(6) Effectiveness of PSYOP Themes in III CTZ.

(Company A)

OBSERVATION: In III CTZ, the theme of hardships to be endured in the jungle is not very effective against NVA or NVA reinforced VC Main Force units. However, the theme of family separation is effective. Conversely, the theme of hardship to be endured is effective against VC regional forces while the theme of family separation is ineffective.

EVALUATION: PSYOPS in III CTZ, as directed by JUSPAO, were reassessed during February and the necessary changes in material to be directed at the various target groups were instituted.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(7) Airboat Communications Equipment.

(Signal Officer)

OBSERVATION: The AN/VRC-47 radio has been found unsatisfactory for use with airboats.

EVALUATION: On 4 April 1968, an airboat test team evaluated the AN/VRC-47 radio for possible use with the airboat complex. Evaluation indicated that the weight of the communications equipment, approximately 120 pounds, adversely affected the operation of the boat at high speeds. It was further noted that an extensive training program on the operation of the equipment would be required for indigenous personnel. Based on the above factors the equipment was rated unsatisfactory. Evaluation of other equipment for use with the airboats continues.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(8) Airboat Communications Equipment.

(Company D)

OBSERVATION: The main problems in airboat communications center around two factors: engine noise and equipment weight.

EVALUATION: Tests with the AN/VRC-12 series FM radio installed in an airboat and the CVC tanker's helmet proved the VRC-12 to be too heavy for airboat operations. The CVC helmet proved to be ideal in reducing engine noise. The AN/PRC-25 radio and CVC tanker's helmet has proven to be the most effective combination for airboat communications.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

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(9) FM Radio Frequency allocations.

(Det B-51)

OBSERVATION: It has been found that FM frequencies assigned to US units in RVN are also being utilized by other allied forces, specifically ROK forces.

EVALUATION: In each instance where the above situation existed, the units involved stated that the frequency authorization was passed from higher level units.

RECOMMENDATION: That close coordination of frequency allocations among FWMAF be effected at the highest level possible.

(10) Use of the M-79 Grenade Launcher as a Signal Device. (Company A)

OBSERVATION: A penlight placed in the barrel of an M-79 provides a better signaling device than does a plain flashlight.

EVALUATION: The M-79 barrel conceals the light from enemy detection and gives the light a directional aspect.

RECOMMENDATION: That a similar signal device be developed which could be placed in the M-79 and activated by the M-79 trigger mechanism.

(11) Support of Tower, AB-105.

(Company A)

OBSERVATION: The AB-105 tower is vulnerable to hostile fire since the cutting of any one of the three support cables would cause it to fall. By sinking the tower ten feet in the ground and encasing it in cement, this danger can be eliminated.

EVALUATION: None.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(12) Aeromedical Evacuation in IV Corps Tactical Zone. (Group Surgeon)

OBSERVATION: The shortage of air ambulance aircraft in IV Corps Tactical Zone often leads to an excessive amount of time in acquiring air evacuation for US personnel.

EVALUATION: Because of the excessive amount of time that is involved in acquiring air evacuation by air ambulance aircraft, it has often been necessary to use any available and suitable tactical aircraft for evacuation purposes. Tactical aircraft can perform air evacuation missions, but only at the expense of the tactical mission.

RECOMMENDATION: That more air ambulance units be assigned to IV CTZ and positioned in a number of locations to provide adequate air evacuation support.

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(13) Unavailability of Sand and Gravel for Construction. (Company D)

OBSERVATION: In certain portions of Vietnam the acquisition of sufficient sand and gravel at a location next to the construction site is almost impossible due to inadequate tools and a lack of sufficient wheeled vehicles. In addition, helicopter lift capability is generally insufficient to insure adequate aggregates on site to continue construction at a programmed pace.

EVALUATION: Foundations and bunkers can be constructed from large timbers that will provide support and protection comparable to concrete if properly designed. Concrete should be considered as a last resort in isolated areas devoid of natural sand and gravel deposits. The cost of aggregates in both price and transportation costs is extremely high compared to timber.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(14) Water Purification.

(Engineer Officer)

OBSERVATION: Source of water in CIDG camps varies from wells to canals or rivers. Subsequently foreign matter, such as dirt and debris, must be filtered from the water prior to consumption.


EVALUATION: Sedimentation of large particles of foreign material in natural water supplies can be improved by adding alum (aluminium sulfate) to the water. This creates a heavy floc that rapidly settles out larger dirt particles. In acid waters, soda ash should be added to neutralize the natural acidity. This procedure should always be used when Army standard filters are used as these filters are designed to remove microscopic dirt particles and large organisms. To filter dirty water through standard filters without prior sedimentation rapidly destroys their effectiveness and may spoil their filtering properties altogether by providing large spaces on the filter through which organisms can pass that would be removed by proper sedimentation prior to filtering. Calcium hypochlorite in powder form or in solution (laundry bleach) is an effective decontaminant in most areas, however, it should be noted that in some areas of Vietnam there exists dangerous organisms that resist destruction by chlorination. A thorough water examination by competent medical personnel should be requested in questionable areas. If such organisms are present, boiling the water is the alternative in addition to chlorination.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

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JONATHAN F. LADD  
Colonel, Infantry  
Commanding

10 Incl:

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period  
Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 1 JUN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,  
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 5th Special Forces (Airborne), 1st Special Forces.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning requirements for Special Forces Aidmen, page 44, paragraph 2a(8). Nonconcur that all medical aidmen in excess of the units authorization be kept in the group. This headquarters requisitions personnel based upon the authorized strength in all MOS's and grades, not on command requirements. The 5th SFG is authorized 231 E7/E5 MOS 91B against an operating strength of 276 or 45 E7/E5 MOS 91B's in excess to authorized. This headquarters has been tasked by MACV to furnish 2176 personnel for the Regional Force/Popular Force, CY 68 buildup. Of this total, 335 are medical specialists NCO's. To support this personnel requirement, the 5th SFG has been levied to date to furnish 45 medical aidmen. Therefore, since the 5th SFG is over its authorized strength in medical aidmen, this headquarters must reassign this personnel overage to higher priority command requirements.

b. Reference item concerning obtaining tactical air support, page 45, paragraph 2b(4). Nonconcur. Instruction on tactical air support is part of the POI in the majority of service schools and in most cases is conducted by Air Force personnel.

c. Reference item concerning construction of airborne training apparatus page 53, paragraph 2c(1). Concur.

d. Reference item concerning timeframes for arclight clearance, page 49, paragraph 2b(16). Concur with recommendation. Units requesting arclight strikes are responsible for obtaining clearance of the target area. The time-frame for clearance can vary from an indefinite period to one or two days, depending on the requesting unit's desires and concurrence by province officials. A 24 hour advance warning for approved arclight requests is given to Field Force/Corps headquarters and in turn readressed to the requesting and adjacent units.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period  
Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)


All arclight messages are transmitted using FLASH precedence followed by telephonic confirmation and, if necessary, personal liaison. This notification procedure assures adequate warning to units operating in the target area. Units following this established procedure increase the effectiveness of the arclight program.

e. Reference item concerning FM radio frequency allocations, page 62, paragraph 2g(9). Concur in the recommendation. FM frequencies are currently allocated in block to Field Force Headquarters for subsequent reallocation within their areas of responsibility. The limited FM frequencies available, the high density of FM sets, and limited geographic area of operations, makes continuous coordination of frequencies imperative. Further, it is essential that reports of dual utilization be made on a timely basis. U. S. and Free World Forces operating within those areas coordinate with the Field Force Headquarters on frequency requirements. This arrangement is deemed the most appropriate coordination level for the operational situation within RVN.

f. Reference item concerning aeromedical evacuation in IV Corps Tactical Zone, page 62, paragraph 2g(12). Concur. This office is aware of the need for additional air-ambulance aircraft (Dust-off) in the Delta and currently is negotiating for real estate in that region for the placement there of a medical detachment (RA). Such placement will increase available aircraft and should reduce response time for aeromedical evacuations.

g. Reference item concerning use of the M79 grenade launcher as a signal device, page 62, paragraph 2g(10): Nonconcur. A strobelight, official designator, Marker Light Distress, FSN 62300675209, a component of the survival kit, lightweight aviator, is considered appropriate for covert signal requirements. This light is available for issue upon submission of requisition with appropriate justification. Therefore, additional development effort is not felt to be warranted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
C. S. NAKATSUKASA  
Captain, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:  
HQ, 5th SFG (Abn)

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GPOP-DT (15 May 68) (C) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 5th Special Forces Gp (Abn) for  
Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

26 JUN 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding  
indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. (C) The following additional comments are pertinent to the 1st  
Indorsement:

a. Reference paragraph 2d: The recommendation is reasonable and  
will serve to improve intelligence on the target areas and the effec-  
tiveness of the arclight program.

b. Reference paragraph 2f:

(1) Current medical air ambulance service is provided in IV CTZ by  
the 82d Medical Detachment (RA) located at Soc Trang.

(2) The 45th Medical Company (Air Ambulance maintains two air  
ambulances on site at Dong Tam, vicinity of My Tho.

(3) One additional air ambulance detachment has been programmed for  
deployment to Can Tho and is scheduled to arrive in Vietnam in December  
1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

*C. L. Sargent*  
C. L. SARGENT  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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## TROOP DISPOSITION LIST - I CORPS

DATE	NR	CSF	NO	PF	MSF	ETHNIC GROUPS	MISSION
OPENED							
Sep 62	195					C&C	
Feb 68	172					CSF	
Nov 65	607		178	691		CSF/SS	
Feb 63	474					CSF	
Apr 65	462		196	210		CSF/SS	
Sep 63	219					CSF/BS/TC	
Mar 65	364		178	89		CSF/SS	
Mar 65	400			470		CSF/SS	
Mar 66	391		104	216		CSF/SS	
Apr 66	547					CSF	
Mar 67					1058	MSF	
TOTAL	3831		756	1676			

## II CORPS

Co B	Pleiku	AR76515021	Oct 62	172			C&C	VN/MONT
B-20	Pleiku	AR76515021	Nov 67	93			MSF	VN/MONT
B-22	Qui Nhon	CR09912281	Jan 65	166			C&C/MSF	VN/MONT
A-221	Cung Son	BQ80104346	Jan 66	523			CSF	VN/MONT
A-222	Dong Tre	BQ90957425	Jun 63	655			CSF	VN/MONT
A-224	Phu Tuc	BQ50405965	May 65	554	196		CSF/SS	MONT
A-227	Ha Tay	BR79908301	Jun 67	533			CSF	VN/MONT
A-120	Vinh Thanh	BR61586052	Oct 65	531	131		CSF/SS	VN/MONT
23	Ban Me Thuot	AQ78000400	Nov 64	136			CSF/MSF	MONT
A-231	Tieu Atar	ZV02206235	Dec 67	554			CSF/BS	MONT
A-232	Tan Rai	ZT09958765	Jan 66	224			CSF	THAI/VN/CHINESE/MONT
A-233	Trang Phuoc	ZT03662671	Sep 66	536			CSF/BS	MONT
A-234	An Cac	AP86474847	May 65	510			CSF	VN/MONT
A-235	Nhon Co	YJ80402505	May 66	373			CSF/BS	VN/CAMB/MONT
A-236	Bu Prang	YJ48895610	Oct 67	319			CSF	MONT
A-237	Luong Son	BNI2503850	Jan 66	557			CSF	VN/MONT/CHINESE
A-238	Buon Plech	BQ00785942	Jul 66	559			CSF/BS	MONT
A-239	Duc Lap	YJ91327513	Nov 66	131			C&C/MSF	VN/MONT
B-24	Kon Tum	AR27318891	Jan 66	126			CSF/BS	VN/MONT
A-241	Polei Kleng	ZAO3269330	Mar 66	244			CSF/BS	VN/MONT
A-242	Dak Pek	YB94976842	Nov 62	587			CSF	VN/MONT
A-243	Platau G	BS08651555	Jan 65	330			CSF/BS	VN/MONT
A-244	Dak To	ZB0122215C	Aug 65	737			CSF	VN/MONT
A-245	Dak Seang	YB89594051	Jul 66	347			CSF/BS	VN/MONT

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Incl 1 to 5th S. GA ORILL for Quarter Ending 30 Apr 68

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## TROOP DISPOSITION LIST - (CONTINUED)

DET	LOCATION	COORD	DATE OPENED	MR CSF	MR RF	MR PF	MSF	MISSION	ETHNIC GROUPS
A-246	Mang Buk	AS98411180	Jul 64	376				CSF	MONT
A-251	Plei Djereng	YA87454590	Dec 66	390				CSF/BS	VN/MONT
A-113	Plei Mrong	ZAL1256700	Nov 62	586				CSF	VN/MONT
A-253	Duc Co	YA8602493	Jun 62	453				CSF	VN/MONT
A-255	Plei Me	ZA16240592	Oct 63	449				CSF	VN/MONT
B-51	Dong Ba Thien	CP04002900	Apr 64	396				TC	VN/MONT/CAMBODIAN
A-52	Nha Trang	CP03105180	Apr 64	166				DELTA	VN/MONT
A-502	Trung Dung	BF93705571	Mar 64	1429				CSF/SS	MONT
A-503	Nha Trang	CP03105180	Jun 64	209				MSF	MONT/NUNGS
Recondo	Nha Trang	CP03105180	Jun 64	132				RS	
HHC	Nha Trang	CP03105180	N/A					SPT	
Co E	Nha Trang	CP03105180	N/A					SPT	
VNSF	H/C Nha Trang	CP03805330	N/A					C&C	
5/27	Nha Trang	CP03105180	N/A					SPT	
Arty				9194	144	1223	3132		
TOTAL									
III CORPS									
Co A	Bien Hoa	YT009C-270	Nov 64	75				C&C	CAMBODIAN
A-301	Trang Sup	XT16595558	Jan 63	394				CSF/TC	VN/CAMBODIAN
A-302	Long Hai	YSL3965104	Sep 67				1425	MSF	VN/CAMBODIAN/CHINESE
B-32	Tay Ninh	XT20455087	Dec 67	321				C&C	VN/CAMBODIAN
A-321	Ben Soi	XT09344748	Mar 65	537				CSF/BS	VN/CAMBODIAN
A-322	Katum	XT32998977	Feb 68	499				CSF/BS	VN/CAMBODIAN/ISLAM
A-323	Thien Ngon	XT28688159	Dec 67	579				CSF/BS	VN/CAMBODIAN
-324	Nui Ba Den	XT28105820	Jul 64					RADIO RELAY	
A-33	Hon Quan	XT15768732	Mar 68	150				C&C	VN/CAMBODIAN/STIENG
A-331	Loc Ninh	XU73440823	Dec 66	564				CSF/BS	VN/CAMBODIAN
A-332	Minh Thanh	XT64356682	Feb 64	349				CSF	STIENG/CHINESE
A-333	Chi Linh	XT91607350	Jan 67	358				CSF	VN/CAMBODIAN/STIENG
A-334	Tong Le Chon	XT62228103	Mar 67	529				CSF/BS	VN/CAMBODIAN/SEDANG
B-34	Song Be	YU18000958	Nov 67	132				C&C	VN/CAMBODIAN/CHAM
A-341	Bu Dop	XU97452909	Nov 65	350				SS/CSF/BS	VN/CAMBODIAN/STIENG
A-342	Dong Xoai	YT07647597	Jun 65	332				CSF/SS	VN/CAMBODIAN/STIENG
A-343	Duc Phong	YU13750499	Apr 66	500				CSF/SS	VN/CAMBODIAN/RHADE/FULRE/NAN
A-344	Bunard	YT27018877	Apr 67	330			32	CSF	VN/CAMBODIAN/MONT
B-35	Duc Hoa	XS60009625	Dec 66	168				C&C	VN/CAMBODIAN
A-351	Duc Hue	XS32000900	Nov 67	340				CSF/BS	VN/CAMBODIAN/CHINESE

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## TROOP DISPOSITION LIST - (CONTINUED)

DET	LOCATION	COORD	DATE OPENED	NR CSF	NR EF	NR PF	MSF	MISSION	ETHNIC GROUP
A-352	Tra Qu	XS47759816	Jan 67	355				CSF/ES	VN/CAMBODIAN
E-36	Long Hai	YS43845122	Sep 67				621	C&C/MSF	CAMBODIAN/ CHINESE
			TOTAL	355	339	800	2016		
IV CORPS									
				160					
C D	Can Tho	WS84301160	Jan 63					C&C	VN/CAMBODIAN
B-40	Can Tho	WS84301030	Mar 68				1289	C&C/MSF	VN/CAMBODIAN/ CHINESE
A-401	Dong Phuoc	WT51300100	Oct 67					MSF	VN/CAMBODIAN/ CHINESE
A-402	Moc Hoa	XS02828995	Mar 63					MSF	VN/CAMBODIAN
A-403	Moc Hoa	XS02828995	Mar 63					MSF	CAMBODIAN/CHINESE
B-41	Moc Hoa	XS03059091	Feb 65			355		C&C/S/SS	
A-411	My Phuoc Tau	XS20065984	Feb 67	484	269			CSF	VN/CAMBODIAN
									CHINESE
A-412	Kinh Quan II	WS97657585	Oct 65	557	445	117		CSF/SS	VN/MONT/CAMBODIAN
A-413	Binh Than Thon	WT06180331	May 65	464	131	336		CSF/SS	VN/CAMBODIAN
A-414	Thanh Tri	XS05759953	Mar 68	396				CSF/ES	VN/MONT/CAMBODIAN
A-415	Tuyen Nhon	XS27877758	Apr 65	472	89	123		CSF/BS/SS	VN/CAMBODIAN
A-416	My Dien II	XS36506050	Jan 68	296				CSF	VN/CAMBODIAN
B-42	Chau Doc	WS13208410	Mar 65	62	279	1335		C&C/S/SS	
-421	Ba Xoai	VS95596279	May 66	841				CSF/ES	VN/CAMBODIAN
A-429	Vinh Gia	VS76226090	Aug 64	658				CSF/BS	CAMBODIAN
B-43	Cao Lanh	WS69515616	Feb 67	630	320			C&C/S/SS	VN/CAMBODIAN
A-431	Cai Cai	WT56160750	Apr 65	505	396	809		CSF/BS/SS	VN/CAMBODIAN/ MONT/CHINESE
A-432	Thoung Thoi	WS31109565	May 66					CSF/SS	VN/CAMBODIAN
A-433	My DA	WS9886205	Mar 67	721	453	305		CSF/SS	VN/CAMBODIAN
A-441	Phu Quoc	HS86712857	Feb 65	527	615	86		CSF/SS	VN/CAMBODIAN/CHIN
A-442	To Chau	VS45604552	Feb 67	212				TC	VN/CAMBODIAN/CHIN
			TOTAL	5965	3357	3466	1289		

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
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Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65(RI) (U)

LEGEND:

C&C	-	Command and Control
CSF	-	Camp Strike Force (Formerly Civilian Irregular Defense Group)
MSF	-	Mobile Strike Force (Formerly Mike Force)
BS	-	Border Surveillance
S/SS	-	Sector/Subsector
VN	-	Vietnamese
MONT	-	Montagnard
RF	-	Regional Force (Province Level)
PF	-	Popular Force (District Level)
TC	-	Training Center
RS	-	Recondo School

Incl 1-4

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


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INCLOSURE 1 TO OPERATIONAL REPORT  
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 30 APR 1968 Incl 1-6

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
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## IV CORPS




ENCLOSURE 1 TO OPERATIONAL REPORT  
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 30 APR 1968 Inx1.1-8

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**CONFIDENTIAL**  
5TH SFGA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE



Incl 1-9

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\* Nha Trang Installation Defense Command

----- ATTACHED  
----- ASSIGNED

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

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STATISTICAL DATA

	<u>STATISTICAL DATA</u>				TOTAL
	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ	
1. (C) Missions					
a. Squad	1261	1030	5770	14170	30505
b. Platoon	868	2132	2092	8381	13473
c. Company or Larger	348	875	669	1761	3653
2. (C) Contacts:					
a. Contacts resulting from Friendly Offensive Action:	108	522	325	398	1353
b. VC attacks on installations and convoys:	54	111	171	549	885
c. Incidents:	31	37	67	426	561
3. (C) Confirmed VC Losses:					
a. KIA	317	915	421	839	2492
b. WIA	74	78	98	136	386
c. CPTR	52	73	38	294	457
d. Quarterly Comparison of Confirmed VC Losses Country-wide:					
	KIA	CPTR			
2d Quarter 67	1931	361			
3d Quarter 67	1624	291			
4th Quarter 67	2041	228			
1st Quarter 68	2492	457			
4. (C) USASF Losses:					
a. KIA	3	9	4	1	17
b. WIA	27	81	27	39	174
c. MIA	10	1	1	0	12
d. Quarterly comparison of USASF casualties country-wide:					
	KIA	WIA	MIA	TOTAL	
2d Quarter 67	29	25	2	51	
3d Quarter 67	16	92	1	109	
4th Quarter 67	37	146	5	188	
1st Quarter 68	17	174	12	283	

Incl 2 to 5th SFGA ORLL for Quarter Ending 30 April 1968

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## STATISTICAL DATA (CONTINUED)

### 5. (C) VNSF Losses

	<u>I</u> <u>CTZ</u>	<u>II</u> <u>CTZ</u>	<u>III</u> <u>CTZ</u>	<u>IV</u> <u>CTZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
a. KIA		8	2	3	13
b. WIA	3	9	12	7	31
c. MIA	6				6

#### d. Quarterly Comparison of VNSF Casualties Country-wide.

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
2d Quarter 67	6	25	2	33
3d Quarter 67	2	16		18
4th Quarter 67	7	26	2	35
1st Quarter 68	13	31	6	50

### 6. (C) CIDG Losses

a. KIA	28	138	137	127	430
b. WIA	155	540	466	316	1477
c. MIA	208	4	18	7	237

#### d. Quarterly Comparison of CIDG Casualties Country-wide.

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
2d Quarter 67	436	1419	131	1986
3d Quarter 67	260	1012	28	1300
4th Quarter 67	421	1254	104	1779
1st Quarter 68	430	1477	237	2144

### 7. (C) RF/PF Losses

a. KIA	17	7	9	188	221
b. WIA	16	17	22	359	414
c. MIA	27			78	105

#### d. Quarterly Comparison of RF/PF Casualties Country-wide.

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
2d Quarter 67	101	178	26	305
3d Quarter 67	56	167	1	224
4th Quarter 67	136	371	28	535
1st Quarter 68	221	414	105	740

### 8. (C) Weapons

a. Friendly Weapons Lost	63	92	64	379	598
b. Enemy Weapons Lost	89	379	214	570	1252

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**S E C R E T**  
 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE) 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
 APO San Francisco 96240

AVGB-MH

22 April 1968

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIDG PROGRAM, 1964 - 1968 (U)

1. (S) Background and Early Development of the CIDG Program:

a. Concept and Objectives: The CIDG program was established on 1 November 1961 under the operational control of the Combined Studies Division (CSD) of MACV. The program was designed to develop counterinsurgency paramilitary forces from ethnic minority groups in remote areas of Vietnam where the government had little or no control and to gain the loyalty and cooperation of these isolated groups. The paramilitary force, once trained and developed, would offer a measure of self protection to the population in these remote areas, reduce support to the VC, create obstacles to VC activities and movement, and provide an intelligence capability.

b. Responsibilities: The role of the USASF personnel was then, as it is now, to advise and assist the VNSF in the conduct of the CIDG program.

c. Support: USASF personnel were given the initial responsibility for providing the logistical and administrative support and the military training of the paramilitary Strike Forces and Hamlet Militia of the related Strategic Hamlet Program. The CSD retained overall responsibility, including that of logistical and financial support, until July 1963 when responsibility for counterinsurgency programs in RVN passed to MACV in a phased operation called SWITCHBACK. During the initial stage of the paramilitary CIDG program, funds for the program were received through Controlled American Source (CAS) channels because of the necessity for certain deviations in Army funding and logistical regulations. In order to continue the support of paramilitary forces through Department of the Army channels, these deviations were approved under OPERATION SWITCHBACK. The Army Counterinsurgency Support Office (USACISO) was established, initially under G4, USARYIS, on 27 February 1963 to effect support of OPERATION SWITCHBACK through tri-service supply depots and local procurement and to account for the out-of-country PARASOL SWITCHBACK funds. In-country funds for procurement and salaries were received from CSD and accounted for by USASF.

d. Development through 1964:

(1) The program made initial success in an experimental effort with the Rhade tribe of Darlac Province in II CTZ. By 1 February 1963, U.S. Special Forces A Detachments were located in all four Corps Tactical Zones at approximately 25 operational CIDG camp sites. There was a control B Detachment at each of the Corps Headquarters. By August 1963, USASF detachments, working through counterpart Vietnamese Special Forces units, had trained and armed 14,645 Strike Force (CIDG) and 37,918 Hamlet Militia. On 26 October 1963, USASF in Vietnam were assigned an additional mission, the responsibility for the

Incl 4 to 5th SFCA ORLL for Quarter Ending 30 April 1968

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Development of the CIDG Program, 1964 - 1968 (U)

Border Surveillance (BS) Program which had started in June 1962 under the operational control of CSD. Units in this program had previously been called "Trailwatchers", and later "Mountain Scouts". Personnel from the Border surveillance and Mountain Scout units were integrated into Strike Forces and other units. In November 1963, there was a total of four BS CIDG camp sites. By mid-1964 the total had increased to 18, which was one half the total CIDG camp sites staffed by USASF. The trend for the establishment of camps closer to the border areas had begun.

(2) Although CSD directed the program up to 1 July 1963, from the beginning the actual field operations were carried out by Special Forces personnel with the first regular detachments being deployed in March 1962. Up to October 1964, these detachments were deployed to RVN for six months temporary duty from Okinawa (1st Special Forces Group), and CONUS (5th and 7th Special Forces Groups). After October 1964, all personnel were deployed on permanent change of station (PCS). Headquarters, USA Special Forces (Provisional) (Vietnam) was established in September 1962 in Saigon to command the Special Forces detachments on TDY in the RVN. The personnel assigned to the headquarters were on a PCS basis. In May 1963, the headquarters was moved to Nha Trang and in October 1964, was reorganized as HQ, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

2. (S) Growth and Development of the CIDG Program, 1964 - 1968:

a. General: Since 1964, the CIDG program has expanded tremendously as reflected by the statistics at inclosure 1. The number of CIDG camps has expanded from 25 in 1964 to the present total of 64. The total number of CIDG in the program has increased from approximately 20,000 to 42,962. A corresponding increase in personnel (USASF and VNSF), administrative, logistical, and financial support was therefore necessary. Tactics changed and new concepts were employed during the period. Target dates were established for the eventual transfer of control of the CIDG program to RVNAF, but could not be realized. The deployment of US conventional forces to RVN in 1965 affected both CIDG operations and the logistical system. During the enemy TET offensive in January and February 1968, the CIDG forces demonstrated that they had developed into the effective paramilitary force envisioned in 1961. The chronological sequence of significant events and activities found at inclosure 2 reflects the gradual growth and development of the CIDG program, tactics, organization, concepts employed, and successes and failures during the period 1 January 1964 to April 1968.

b. CIDG Logistical Support:

(1) There have been few basic changes in the logistical system since 1964; however, these changes have significantly increased the flexibility and responsiveness of the logistical system. In 1964, supplies and equipment were delivered directly from the Logistical Support Center (LSC) in Nha Trang by air, LST, and motor convoy to all detachments except A and B detachments in I Corps Tactical Zone. Detachment C-1 in Da Nang acted as a forward supply point (FSP) for all elements in I CTZ. C Detachments in II, III, and IV CTZ did not act as forward supply points. Today there are five FSP's, one located at each of the four C detachment sites and one at Detachment B-23, Ban Me Thout. Each

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FSP maintains a 15 day stockage level of all supplies and equipment and is responsible for supplying subordinate detachments within their Corps area. The FSP at Pleiku supports the camps in the northern portion of II Corps while the FSP at Ban Me Thout directly supports the southern half. There are three principal advantages which have accrued from the forward supply point concept:

- (a) Maximum utilization of aircraft is realized.
- (b) Order-to-ship time from the detachments is reduced.
- (c) There is now a dispersion of bulk supplies which reduces the concentration of supplies at the LSC.

(2) In 1964 the USACISO furnished about 80 percent of all supplies, and the remainder was obtained from the US Army Support Command and local sources. However, with the buildup of US Forces in Vietnam in 1965-1966, many items which were being ordered from Okinawa were readily available from depots of the 1st Logistical Command. As a result, an inter-service support agreement (ISSA) was established between the 5th Special Forces Group and USARV. There was an ISSA already in effect with the Naval support activity in I CTZ. Under the provisions of this agreement, common class I, II, III, IV, and V items are now drawn on a reimbursable fill or kill basis (no due outs established) from the 1st Logistical Command. Most class I supplies are obtained in-country with the exception of indigenous patrol rations and canned foods which are purchased in Japan. Class II and IV supplies are procured from two sources, USACISO (the primary source), and through the ISSA. Class III products are obtained in-country on a reimbursable basis as is most class V. An additional source of supply, which was also available in 1964, is local purchase. Regardless of the source however, all supplies except local 5th SFGA purchases are paid for by USACISO from PARASOL SWITCHBACK funds.

(3) Supplies are delivered from the LSC to the FSP's by both water and air, but are no longer delivered by motor convoy. Motor convoys are utilized, however, on a limited basis to transfer supplies from the FSP to the subordinate detachments when air movement or air drop is not available or possible. Average monthly tonnage shipped from the LSC includes 2,140 tons air landed, 21 tons air dropped, and 1,070 tons sea lift. Any camp in-country can be emergency resupplied within three hours using pre-rigged emergency bundles located both at the LSC and the forward supply points.

#### c. CIDG Organization:

(1) CIDG Camp Strike Force and Combat Reconnaissance Platoons: In 1964 a CIDG Light Guerrilla Company (150 CIDG personnel) consisted of three rifle platoons and one weapons platoon. Presently, the equivalent company, now referred to as a Camp Strike Force Company, consists of 132 CIDG also formed into three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon. Besides the reduction in personnel, the main change in the organization of the CIDG company has occurred in the weapons authorized. (See charts at inclosure 3.) In January 1966 (TOE 3-66), a combat reconnaissance platoon (CRP) of 34 CIDG was authorized each CIDG camp to add flexibility and a reconnaissance capability. This additional force,

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besides giving the camp an additional capability, compensated for the reduction in manpower per CIDG company. A second CRP per CIDG camp was authorized on 1 Feb 1967.

(2) Mobile Strike Force:

(a) The most significant change in the organization of the CIDG occurred during the summer of 1965 when the Mike Force now (Mobile Strike Force) was established. The need for some type of special force to react to emergencies encountered by the small Special Forces camps in II CTZ was realized early and on 16 October 1964 and "Eagle Flight" detachment was formed at Pleiku. It consisted of five USASF personnel TDY from the 1st SFGA and 36 Rhade Tribesmen. The Montagnards were trained in the various Special Forces skills and even received the ground portion of jump training to include the equivalent of the 34 foot tower training. (However, at that time the USASF were specifically not authorized to allow the Rhades to conduct actual jumps.) Because the "Eagle Flight" personnel were more highly skilled than the regular CIDG soldier, a special (higher) pay scale was approved and overall grade level was also higher. A hazardous duty pay of 1000 piasters a month was also authorized. Armed with M2 carbines and with the direct support of six "slick" helicopters and three gunships from Camp Holloway, the "Eagle Flight" successfully performed reconnaissance and search and seizure missions, but were most effectively utilized as a reaction force in support of camps under attack and friendly elements caught by enemy ambushes. Sometimes they served as a blocking force and sometimes as a pursuing force. "Eagle Flight" was entirely mobile.

(b) When the 5th SFG arrived in-country in October 1964, the importance of the Eagle Flight mission as a reaction force was immediately recognized. Plans began to be formulated to form a reaction force for each of the four Corps areas. The Mike Force was the result. The name "Mike Force" originated from the phonetic alphabet "Mike" for the "M" in Mobile Force. Mike Force units were committed as an overt conventional force designed to supplement the offensive power of the Special Forces effort.

(c) The organizational structure and mission of the Mike Force, when it was established in August 1965, is depicted at inclosure h. This structure was slightly changed by the time the first Mike Force TO&E was published in January 1966. This TO&E provided for a separate recon platoon of 19 men rather than three separate six-man recon squads for each of the three rifle squads. The total authorized strength of the Mike Force Company was also increased from 185 to 198. In mid-1966 another concept of employment of the Mike Force evolved, the Mobile Guerrilla Force (MGF) concept. A Mobile Guerrilla Task Force consisted of one USASF A Detachment (Command and Control), one 150 man Mobile Guerrilla Company (Mike Force trained in guerrilla warfare), and one 34 man Combat Reconnaissance Platoon. The force was capable of operating in remote areas previously considered VC/NVA safe areas for periods of 30 to 60 days. Its mission included: border surveillance, interdiction of enemy infiltration routes, and the conduct of both reconnaissance and Combat operations. The concept of operations called for the CRP to deploy into the area of operation ahead of the Mobile Guerrilla Company. The Mobile Guerrilla Company would then deploy and react to intelligence furnished by the CRP. These operations were called "Blackjack" operations. The first MGF operation, Blackjack 21, was initiated in SW Kontum Province on 13 October 1966 after five weeks of planning and preparation. The operation ended on 10 November 1966 and was a

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total success resulting in 45 VC/NVA KIA and several infiltration routes, base camps, and caches located. MGF Blackjack operations continued to be successful. The evolution of the Mike Force continued. In mid-1967, integration of the MGF and Mike Force began and in October 1967 the two, together, officially became known as the Mobile Strike Force (MSF). The missions and capabilities of both forces were retained. During the period of August 1965 through the summer of 1967, the MSF (formerly Mike Force) were under the unilateral command of the USASF. At approximately the same time that the MGF and Mike Force merged into the MSF, the VNSF were also integrated and a joint VNSF/USASF command of the MSF was established.

(d) In December 1967 the MSF expanded to its present authorized strength of 8250 CIDG, 47 companies of 184 CIDG each, and organized as depicted at inclosure 4. Still another expansion of the Mobile Strike Force has been proposed and is presently under consideration. A total of 13,121 MSF soldiers, organized into MSF companies as shown in inclosure 5, will be authorized upon approval of this proposal. The proposal also includes the formation of a MSF Command and Control B Detachment for each CTZ and for the MSF country-wide reserve at Nha Trang.

(3) The FY 69 budget provides for equipping the MSF, the CRP, and the CSF with the M-16 rifle, M-60 machine gun, and the M-79 grenade launcher to bring their firepower capability up to the level of that of the enemy.

d. Special Operations:

(1) Project Delta (Leaping Lena):

(a) On 15 May 1964, Project Delta (originally called Project Leaping Lena) was initiated as a covert operation in Vietnam. Initially Project Delta included one USASF A Detachment whose primary mission was to train the CIDG and VNSF in the conduct of a long range reconnaissance patrols (LRRP). By June 1965 the USASF had assumed a more active role in Project Delta and detachment B-52 had been organized for command and control. The present missions, as listed below in order of priority, were assumed.

1. Locate enemy units, installations and/or activities for strategic or tactical exploitation.
2. Gather information.
3. Direct artillery/TAC AIR and conduct bomb damage assessment.
4. Act as Hunter Killer Teams.
5. Conduct Search and Destroy operations on limited targets.
6. Conduct Special Purpose raids.
7. To reinforce A Detachments and other units.
8. To conduct harassing, cover and deception missions.

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Delta operations are conducted country-wide as directed by COMUSMACV under the operational control of the Corps Commander in whose Corps the operation is conducted. Personnel assets of Project Delta include USASF, VNSF, CIDG and one battalion of Vietnamese Rangers, which are the main reaction force.

(b) In September 1965, Detachment B-52 began a unit training program in Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol techniques for its replacement personnel. At the request of US Conventional units, they also trained other US personnel in LRRP techniques. This training mission was assumed on 15 September 1966 by the direction of COMUSMACV.

(2) In mid-1966 Projects Omega and Sigma (Detachments B-50 and B-56) were established with a mission similar to that of Project Delta.

(3) Detachment B-36 (Provisional): On 1 November 1967, the operational control of Projects Omega and Sigma was transferred to MACSOG. Detachment B-36 (Provisional) was organized in August 1967 to fill the gap in the strategic and tactical reconnaissance capabilities of II and III CTZ that would be created by the impending transfer. Detachment B-36 reconnaissance operations are conducted by USASF, CIDG (MSF), and conventional US (LRRP) personnel from III CTZ.

(4) Significant Special operations conducted by Detachments B-36, B-50, B-52 and B-56 are included in the significant activities/events in inclosure 2.

e. Civic Actions and Psychological Operations: The CIDG program was initially launched to gain the loyalty and cooperation of relatively isolated population groups through civic action projects and psychological operations as well as by training and organization of Strike Force units for local security of the areas. In June 1964, according to the case study on the U.S. Special Forces CIDG mission in Vietnam conducted by Special Operation Research Office, (SORO), The American University, the status of civic action and psychological operations was described as follows. "These activities continue mainly with U.S. personnel acting as the principal, rather than in an advisory role. Lack of interest in these programs on the part of the VNSF personnel - who are generally unindoctrinated in the need for such effort - reflect the continuing GVN attitude toward the CIDG program." The same is basically true for the present.

(1) In evaluating progress made by the VNSF in areas which U.S. evaluators would call civil affairs (CA), civic action (CIVAC), or psychological operations (PSYOP), it is important to bear in mind that the VNSF do not subscribe to the same CA/CIVAC/PSYOP concepts as do the USASF. This divergence is especially noticeable in the area of CIVAC. The VNSF in general do not actively oppose USASF CIVAC efforts, but they often do not agree with the U.S. approach. In particular, they usually feel that CIVAC benefits should only be extended to a given group of people if that group is giving actual, tangible assistance to local GVN forces (e.g., information about the VC). A corollary to this is the feeling that since the CIDG are contributing as much or more to the GVN effort as any other group in the area, the CIDG should receive the lion's share

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of CIVAC benefits. Another difference in view point is the fact that U.S. Forces often tend to separate CA and PSYOP, with CIVAC as a part of the latter, or even as a separate program. In the RVNAF, these activities, along with others, are considered to be parts of a coordinated whole: the political warfare (POLWAR) program. This fact is often not fully understood by U.S. advisers. The POLWAR program contains the following major sub-programs:

- (a) Psychological warfare (Similar to U.S. PSYOP, less CIVAC).
- (b) Political indoctrination and training.
- (c) Social welfare (mostly oriented toward troops and troop families).
- (d) PX/commissary system.
- (e) Internal security.
- (f) Press and information activities.
- (g) Chaplain activities.

(2) This headquarters is unable to evaluate progress made in programs listed under 2a(1)(e), 2a(1)(f), and 2a(1)(g). Progress in the remaining areas includes the following:

(a) Psychological warfare: The VNSF have assumed slightly more initiative in developing PSYOP themes to meet specific, obvious threats. PSYOP effort in general has improved because of the increased support capability of the 4th PSYOP Group (U.S.), ARVN POLWAR units, which are supposed to support the VNSF, rarely perform their missions. As a result, the 4th PSYOP Group supports both VNSF and USASF efforts.

(b) Political indoctrination and training: A motivation program directed at the CIDG, using civilian instructor cadre, was in operation during 1966; however, it was discontinued in January 1967. The VNSF High Command (VNSFHC) has shown particular interest in re-establishing and maintaining such a program, and this is currently being done as a joint project of the USASF (5th SFUA) and VNSFHC; cadre are being hired and POI are being prepared for a resumption of the program. In the field, VNSF POLWAR personnel give lectures or perform other political indoctrination activities. These are limited as much by the non-availability of personnel as by any other factors. VNSF political indoctrination POI and other documents are regularly distributed.

(c) Social Welfare: The VNSFHC has developed an active Social Welfare section which operates in the Nha Trang area. This program is largely neglected in the field because of non-availability of VNSF personnel.

(d) PX/commissary system: CIDG PX's and commissaries are operative in several CIDG camps, and the program is being expanded as a joint VNSF/USASF effort.

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(3) The programs cited above as currently in effect may all be taken to represent progress since 1 January 1964; however, overall the USASF adviser continues to be the principal, rather than the adviser in these activities.

3. (S) Progress of VNSF: CINCPAC in May 1963 made this statement concerning the CIDG concept: "When the GVN is able to assume full responsibility for the CIDG program and success is assured, the US personnel will be withdrawn." Efforts to integrate the CIDG program into RVNAF has thus far been unsuccessful.

a. The procedure of converting CIDG camps to RF control proved unsatisfactory. The CIDG program is offensive in nature and controls a TAOR by employing aggressive patrolling action; whereas, the RF/PF mission is defensive in nature. While hostilities continue, conversion to RF/PF is undesirable.

b. Another course of action being tried is the transfer of camps to VNSF control. Three camps have been transferred to VNSF control; however, the VNSF do not presently have sufficient numbers of qualified personnel to continue this program. The entire VNSF Group's resources have been taxed to provide three A Detachments capable of assuming control of the camps. The SORO study on the US Special Forces CIDG Mission in Vietnam mentioned two deficiencies of the VNSF: (1) a lack of continuity of VNSF personnel in the CIDG program and (2) the character of the VNSF organization charged with the execution of the program and the caliber of its officer personnel. The study cited "instances of US A Detachment Commanders serving under three of four VNSF Camp Commanders in a six month tour". This situation does not exist today. Being a separate service, the VNSF has resorted to its own form of recruitment which has resulted in processing additional personnel for reasons of political affiliation. Most of the recent replacements are very young and inexperienced. In addition, the majority of the VNSF officers do not possess adequate knowledge of tactics, administration, or logistics. Since the integration of the VNSF into the command structure of the MSF, there has been a general deterioration in the effectiveness of the MSF. This can be attributed to three factors:

(1) The fact that the MSF is composed of personnel from ethnic minority groups which possess an inherent animosity and distrust of Vietnamese.

(2) The general lack of qualified leaders within the VNSF.

(3) The fact that the VNSF many times refuse to accompany the MSF on combat operations. The MSF is the type of organization that must be led by example.

c. Presently, the training level of the average VNSF is insufficient, much less his ability to assume the responsibility of training the CIDG. The VNSF NCO receives only twenty-four weeks of formal military training at the VNSF Dong Ba Thin Training Center unless he is a transfer from ARVN. This twenty-four weeks includes basic and Special Forces MOS training. This MOS training is comparable in length to the shortest MOS courses received by USASF personnel. However, USASF MOS courses are oriented toward senior NCO's

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with an outstanding military background. The lack of adequate conventional prior experience is felt to be the main cause of the ineffectiveness of VNSF NCO's. Those few VNSF NCO's who have comparable time in service with USASF NCO's do compare favorable. The VNSF officers are drawn from conventional units by JGS levy. It is felt that the stated inadequacy of VNSF officer personnel is not due to a lack of conventional formal branch training. As is normal when personnel are assigned against levies, those officers who have made the least use of the formal training available are transferred into the VNSF. The VNSF officer's orientation is comparable in time-frame and scope to the USASF officer orientation course. It is necessarily conducted, however, by VNSF officer personnel who are not adequately qualified to give this training. Because of personnel shortages and continuous high emphasis on immediate operational requirements as well as a constantly increasing scope of training requirements for the CIDG and VNSF, the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) has not had qualified personnel free to attack this long range problem. As a result of the recent addition of personnel to the 5th SFGA Adviser Detachment B-51 (The VNSF Dong Ba Thin Training Center) as well as increased command emphasis and staff supervision, notable recent progress has been made.

d. The responsibility for equipping the CIDG has been assumed entirely by USASF and entire CIDG program is supported from PARASOL SWITCHBACK funds. The VNSF equip and financially support only themselves and presently do not have the capability to support the CIDG program financially or administratively.

4. (U) Summary and Conclusions: Since 1964 the CIDG program has expanded tremendously and the CIDG forces have developed into the effective paramilitary force envisioned in 1961. With the assistance of USASF advisers, the success and the growth of the CIDG program is expected to continue.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



D. E. BROCK  
MAJ, INF  
Adjutant

5 Incl

1. Statistical Data, 1964-1968
2. Significant Events/Activities, 1964-1968.
3. CIDG Company Organization, 1964-1968.
4. MSF (Mike Force) Company Organization, Aug 65 and Apr 68.
5. MSF Proposed Organization.
6. Sources.

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## STATISTICAL DATA

(Dash indicates information not available or not applicable)

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### 1. (C) Personnel Strength:

	Jan 1964	Jan 1965	Jan 1966	Jan 1967	Jan 1968	Projected	
						Jul 1968	Jan 1969
81st Airborne Ranger Bn	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
VN Auth	---	806	806	806	677	677	636
VN Asg	---	336	665	685	741	---	---
VNSF A Det	24	48	60	70	70	82	91
VN Auth	---	672	672	1148	1148	1148	1274
VN Asg	240	576	720	930	950	1148	1274
VNSF B Det	8	8	10	10	10	13	13
VN Auth	---	200	200	325	325	325	325
VN Asg	120	200	200	220	250	325	325
VNSF C Det	(Oct) 4	4	4	4	4	4	4
VN Auth	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
VN Asg	499	1026	1073	1356	1883	1626	1755
CIDG Companies	156	182	244	285	293	365	398
CIDG Asg	18439	26625	31864	38756	39897	50283	55572

### 2. (C) CIDG Camps w/Border Surveillance Role:

YEAR	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
NUMBER	4	18	--	14	28	24

GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals:  
Declassified after 12 years.

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# S E C R E T

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## S E C R E T

## STATISTICAL DATA (Cont'd)

(Dash indicates information not available or not applicable)

## 3. (C) Detachments w/sector or subsector Advisory Role:

YEAR	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
NUMBER	--	--	37	29	18

## 4. (C) Operational Results (1964 - 1966 not available):

YEAR	1967	1968 (As of 1 April)
Enemy KIA (USASF Conf)	7111	2503
USASF KIA	91	30
VNSF KIA	44	11
CIDG	1209	394
RF/FF	562	89
TOTAL Friendly KIA	1906	524

KILL RATIO	1967	1968
USASF : ENEMY	1 : 78.1	1 : 83.4
TOTAL Friendly : Enemy	1 : 3.7	1 : 4.8

## 5. (S) US Expenditures in Support of the CIDG Program: (Expressed in millions):

	FY 1963	FY 1964	FY 1965	FY 1966	FY 1967	FY 1968*
OMA	6.8	20.2	----	45.1	63.5	76.0
PEMA	4.1	9.2	----	29.0	26.1	39.3
TOTAL	10.9	29.4	----	74.1	89.6	115.3

\* Authorized Budget for FY 68.

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S E C R E T

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5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE) 1ST SPECIAL FORCES

## SIGNIFICANT EVENTS/ACTIVITIES FROM JANUARY 1964 TO APRIL 1968

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- 1964: (Mar) USASF Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and alternate headquarters established in Saigon. CIDG Force structure standardized; TOE for a CIDG light guerrilla company established.
- (Apr) Indigenous Patrol Ration developed.
- (May) On 15 May, USASF A Detachments came under OPCON of the senior US advisor in each Corps. Control exercised through SF B Detachment.
- On 15 May, Project Leaping Lena initiated in Vietnam. (Now called Project Delta) Mission to conduct covert operations in Vietnam. USASF A Detachment trained VNSF and CIDG personnel in techniques of long range reconnaissance patrols
- (Jun) SWITCHBACK assumed responsibility for support of Project Leaping Lena (Delta) and MACV Studies and Observation Group (SOG).
- (Jul) Viet Cong strongly attacked CIDG camps at Nam Dong and Poley Krong.
- (Aug) COL John Spears assumes command of USASF.
- (Sep) Montagnards rebel against GVN in five CIDG camps in II CTZ.
- (Oct) 1 Oct 1964, 5th SFGA activated in Vietnam. Hq USASF V changed to Hq 5th SFGA. Transition to PCS ordered. "C" Detachment established in each Corps for command and control.
- "Eagle Flight" reaction force formed in II CTZ. Forerunner of today's Mobile Strike Force.
- 1965: (May) Deployment of US Conventional Combat units to RVN initiated.
- A target date of 1 January 1967 was set by COMUSMACV for attaining complete integration of the CIDG program into the RVNAF.
- (Jun) COMUSMACV approved plan to convert CIDG companies to Regional Forces where possible.

GROUP-1

Downgraded at 3 year intervals:  
Declassified after 12 years.

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# S E C R E T

97 Significant Events/Activities from January 1964 to April 1968 (Cont'd)

- (Jul) COL William A. McKean assumes command of 5th SFGA.
- (Aug) Mike Force established on 1 August.
- (Sep) Project Delta USASF began LRRP training program.  
USASF TOC moved from Saigon to Nha Trang on 10 September.
- 1966: (Mar) Enemy attacked and overran CIDG Camp at Ashau on 11 March.
- (May) Class V support from USARV begins as a result of inter-service support agreement with the 1st Logistical Command.
- (Jun) COL Francis J. Kelley assumes command of 5th SFGA.  
"Operation Nathan Hale" jointly conducted by CIDG forces, 1st Air Cavalry Division, and 101st Airborne Division. Demonstrated the effectiveness of deployment of CIDG troops with conventional forces.
- (Aug-Oct) Projects OMEGA and SIGMA implemented. Long Range Reconnaissance and Intelligence gathering capabilities increased in addition to that already furnished by Project Delta. Under OPCON of CG I Force and CG III Force V respectively.  
  
MACV Recondo School established on 15 September 1966 upon direction of COMUSMACV. Mission: To instruct selected personnel from US and FVMAF units in techniques of long range reconnaissance patrolling.  
  
Mobile Guerrilla Force (MGF) Concept originated. Mission: Deploy into VC dominated areas, establish a series of secret patrol bases, and conduct border surveillance, interdiction of enemy forces and installations within the assigned AO. Composed of USASF A Detachment and Mike Force soldiers. Designed as an economy of force effort intended to project into remote areas not under ARVN/FVMAF/CIDG surveillance.  
  
Camps in IV CTZ Plain of Reeds flooded by deepest flood in recent History. Camps continued to operate by sampan. Airboat and PACV operations initiated and very successful.
- (Nov) IV CTZ Mike Force credited w/rendering ineffective a VC Battalion in Soui Da area. Operations eventually developed into Operation Attleboro.  
  
Mike Forces and CIDG participate in Opns Henry Clay and Thayer with 101st Abn Bde and 1st Air Cav. Div.

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S E C R E T

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Significant Events/Activities from January 1964 to April 1968 (Cont'd)

- (Nov) Mike Force and CIDG participate in Opn "Paul Revere IV" w/4th Inf Div.
- MGF Operation Blackjacket 21 in II CTZ completed. MGF concept further developed and refined.
- CIDG and RF units in I CTZ participate in Opn "Rio Blanco", the first joint/combined operation in I CTZ. Other units were ARVN, VN Rangers, Korean Marines, and U.S. Marines.
- (Dec) Det B-50 (Project Omega) participated in Opn Blackhawk in II CTZ from 12 November - 3 December 66. Extremely successful in gathering intelligence for use in planning future FWMF operations.
- 1967: (Jan) MGF Operation Blackjack 22 completed.
- Three new CIDG camps opened (Con Thien, Cau Song Be, and Tra Cu).
- Operation Blackjack 41 initiated in IV CTZ. Significant in driving VC out of their long secure base area in seven mountains region.
- (Feb) Operation Gatling (II CTZ) conducted by 101st Airborne Division with CIDG and Mike Force showed that a large CIDG provisional battalion could be gathered from diverse sources and operate as a unit within a short span of time. Operation Sam Houston conducted by 4th Infantry Division and CIDG in II CTZ. Operation Pershing conducted in II CTZ by 1st Cavalry Division with CIDG.
- MGF expanded: Operations continue in all four CTZ's. Blackjack 31 completed in IV CTZ on 7 February, 56 enemy killed.
- Heavy contact with battalion size NVA units by CIDG and Mike Force near camp Bu Dop in III CTZ.
- CIDG camps opened at To Chau and Phuoc Tay in IV CTZ.
- (Mar) CIDG and Mike Force units near Bu Dop again establish heavy contact with two NVA battalions.
- Heavy fighting involving CIDG and Mike Force against a VC Battalion accompanies opening of Camp My An in IV CTZ.
- CIDG camps opened at Prek Klok and Tong Le Chon in III CTZ. CIDG camps at Go Dau Ha, Soui Da, and Xom Cat in III CTZ were closed.

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Significant Events/Activities from January 1964 to April 1966. (Cont'd)

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(Apr)

MGF operation Blackjack 32 (III CTZ) conducted 15 March - 3 April - 26 enemy KIA.

1st mass parachute assault by USASF and MIKE Force to initiate operation Harvest Moon and the opening of CIDG camp Bunard in III CTZ.

Camp Prek Klok attacked by estimated two VC battalions on 14 April. First such attack since Ashau in March 1966.

Operation Francis Marion conducted in II CTZ by 4th Infantry Division with OPCON over five camps.

Blackjack 12, a reconnaissance in force operation, was conducted in I CTZ, 63 VC KIA.

(May)

Operation Blackjack 33 was completed in III CTZ (27 April - 24 May). First MGF operation employed in conjunction with LRRP teams (Det B-56 - Sigma). Highly effective. 320 enemy KIA.

The first CIDG Camp (Plei Mrong) was turned over to VNSF control and USASF detachment withdrawn on 1 May.

Camp Leng Vei (I CTZ) attacked by company size NVA force on 4 May. Enemy platoon penetrated but was ejected. Camp suffered heavy damage.

Camp Con Thien (I CTZ) attacked by an estimated two Battalions of NVA on 8 May. Jointly defended by USMC, USASF, and CIDG. 212 confirmed enemy killed.

Two Mike Force companies conducted a parachute assault in seven mountains region, IV CTZ, as part of operation Blackjack 41 on 13 May.

CIDG from Detachment A-106 in I CTZ participated in operation "Malheur" with elements of TF Oregon, 21 enemy killed in action credited.

In IV CTZ much effort was devoted to preparation for the floods expected in the plain of reeds in September and October. A training program with emphasis on boat tactics and operations was conducted. Camps were prepared to conduct maximum offensive operations utilizing airboats, assault boats, and sampans.

(Jun)

COL Jonathan F. Ladd assumes command of the 5th SFGA.

Second CIDG camp (Vinh Gia) transferred to VNSF control on 27 Jun.

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Significant Events/activities from January 1964 to April 1968 (Cont'd)

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- (Jun) From 10 Apr - 15 Jun, Det B-52 (Project Delta) conducted 47 reconnaissance operations in Ashau Valley, I CTZ. 46 enemy KIA. Valuable intelligence collected on enemy troop movements, missions, and capabilities.
- (Jul) Operation Blackjack 42 completed in IV CTZ (3 Jun - 2 Jul). Was the first amphibious infiltration conducted by Special Forces advised elements in RVN. 20 VC KIA.
- Airboat facility at Cau Lanh in IV CTZ was attacked by VC on 3 and 4 July. The VC realize the tactical potential of the airboats in flooded areas.
- Operation Blackjack 34 (III CTZ) conducted from 16 - 21 July. VC regiment located. 126 enemy KIA.
- CIDG Camp Con Thien turned over to USMC on 25 Jul.
- (Aug) CIDG camp Tong Le Chon (III CTZ) repelled an attack by a NVA regiment on 7 August. The enemy suffered 152 confirmed KIA.
- Detachment B-36 (Prov) was organized to furnish III CTZ with strategic and tactical reconnaissance. Impending transfer of OPCON of Project Sigma (B-56) to MACSOG would otherwise leave III CTZ without adequate recon capability.
- MGF Operation Blackjack 28 was completed in II CTZ (30 Jul - 22 Aug). Conducted in conjunction with Operation Winfield Scott. 21 enemy KIA.
- (Sep) Detachment B-36 (Prov) conducted Operation RAPIDFIRE I in III CTZ (5 Sep - 22 Sep). 41 reconnaissance missions conducted utilizing USASF, MSF, and US LRRP personnel. 34 enemy KIA and four captured.
- Reconnaissance operation March I conducted by Det B-50 (Omega) from 8 Jul - 3 Sep. 24 VC KIA, two VC captured.
- Operation Samurai I conducted by Det B-52 (Delta) in I CTZ and included 25 reconnaissance missions. 60 enemy KIA, 13 captured.
- (Oct) CIDG camp Lac Thien (II CTZ) converted to RF on 1 October.
- Mass parachute jump by a 59 man pathfinder team and 296 Mike Force troops was launched on 5 October to open CIDG camp Bu Prang (II CTZ).

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Significant Events/Activities from January 1964 to April 1, 1965 (Cont'd)

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(Oct)

As of 10 October, the terms Nike Force and Mobile Guerilla Force were changed to Mobile Strike Force. The term CIDG includes Mobile Strike Forces, Camp Strike Forces, and Combat Reconnaissance Platoon troops.

Operation Samurai II (Project Delta) completed in I CTZ (16 Sep - 16 Oct). 31 reconnaissance missions conducted. 29 VC KIA, 14 captured.

CIDG camp Tuong Hoa closed on 25 October.

Project Sigma (Det B-56) conducted reconnaissance operation SHORTSTOP in III CTZ during 8 - 25 October. 117 enemy killed.

CIDG camp at Loc Ninh (III CTZ) and elements of 1st U.S. Infantry Division, who reinforced on the 2nd day, repelled attacks by three battalions of VC/NVA from 29 Oct - 2 Nov. Camp Loc Ninh credited with 184 enemy KIA. Full benefits of preparation made for flood operations in IV CTZ, were not realized because heavy flooding did not occur as expected.

CIDG camps Tanh Linh in II CTZ and Ha Tien and Tinh Bien in IV CTZ were converted to RF on 31 October.

(Nov)

OPCON of projects Omega and Sigma (Det B-50) and (Det B-56) transferred to MACSOG on 1 November.

On 3 Nov, a Camp Strike Force (CSF) search and destroy operation from Det A-502 established contact with a VC company and was reinforced by MSF from Det A-503. Results: 23 VC KIA.

Operation Blackjack 22A was completed in II CTZ. Successful in establishing supply chaches and captured large quantities of enemy supplies. 14 NVA KIA, two captured.

CIDG camp Binh Hung (IV CTZ) closed on 9 November.

Between 25 and 28 Nov, Dets A-502 (CSF) and A-503 (MSF) participated in the battle of Dien Khanh with the National Police, VN Rangers, and a ROK battalion. 69 enemy KIA.

Operation RAPIDFIRE IV (Det B-36) conducted in III CTZ from 14 - 26 Nov. Task Force of 35 USASF, 20 LRRP (US), and 236 MSF personnel. Two major enemy units identified. One enemy battalion base camp destroyed.

CIDG Camp Duc Hu (III CTZ) opened.

Det B-20 officially designated as II CTZ MSF command and control detachment.

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(Dec) CIDG camp Mai Tinh (II CTZ) converted on 2 December to RF/FF. Camp Vinh Thanh (II CTZ) transferred to VNSF control on 25 December. Camp Prek Klok (9 Dec), Trai Bi (18 Dec), and Hiep Hoa (30 Dec), are III CTZ camps closed on date indicated. Camp Thien Ngon (III CTZ) opened on 8 December and on 20 December, Camp Tieu Atar (II CTZ) opened.

DA removed balance of payments exemption from SWITCHBACK.

MSF expanded to authorize 47 companies, 184 CIDG per company.

Operation Sultan (Project Delta) conducted in II CTZ from 1 - 25 Dec. Task Force included ten recon roadrunner teams, three companies from ARVN 91st Ranger Bn, and one CIDG platoon. Located numerous trail networks and enemy base camps.

1968: (Jan) Operation Sultan II (Project Delta) conducted in II CTZ from 5 Jan - 26 Jan. Located and identified local force VC and NVA infiltration routes and fortifications through Kontum Province.

RAPIDFIRE V (8 Dec - 25 Jan) conducted by Det B-36 in III CTZ in conjunction with the US 25th Inf Div Operation YELLOWSTONE. Enemy losses: 53 KIA and five captured.

Camp My Dien II (IV CTZ) opened on 20 Jan. CIDG camp Van Canh (II CTZ) converted to RF/FF.

Enemy TET Offensive initiated throughout RVN on 30 Jan. CIDG forces demonstrated that they are a reliable combat force even though the street fighting tactics they utilized in forcing the enemy from major cities were vastly different from the tactics in which they were trained.

(Feb) CIDG Camp Lang Vei (I CTZ) overrun on 7 Feb by NVA tanks accompanied by infantry. First combat utilization of tanks by enemy in RVN.

CIDG Camp Katum (III CTZ) opened on 21 Feb.

(Mar) GVN draft law (15 March) created an immediate and previously unavailable recruitment potential to support expansion in the number of CIDG units.

MSF Strike Force companies expanded from 4 to 5 in CTZ, 9 to 12 in II CTZ, 5 to 7 in III CTZ, and from 6 to 10 in IV CTZ.

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Significant Events/Activities from January 1964 to April 1964 (Continued)

103 (Mar)

Det B-44 on Phu Quoc Island closed. CIDG training center moved from Phu Quoc to To Chau. MSF at To Chau moved to Moc Hoa. CIDG Camp at Moc Hoa moved to Tanh Tri. Det B-40 moved to Can Tho as command and control headquarters of IV CTZ MSF.


Delta Falcon operations initiated in IV CTZ under command and control of 44 STZ. Experienced early successes in utilization of CIDG and other allied forces to furnish an immediate reaction force capability to follow up on visual reconnaissance sightings.

(Apr)


First employment of an integrated MSF and LRRP (US) task force in II CTZ (10 Mar - 5 Apr). Personnel assets from Detachment B-20 (MSF) and E Company, US 20th Inf (LRRP).

# SECRET

## 1968



MAJOR EQUIPMENT ITEM	No.
Carbine, Cal .30, M1	103
launcher, grenade, carbine	24
Machinegun, light, cal .30	3
Mortar, 60 mm	3
Pistol, cal .45	1
Radio, HT-1	20
Radio, TT-20	2
Rifle, automatic, Browning, Cal .30	18
Submachine, Cal .45, M3	29




MAJOR EQUIPMENT ITEM	No.
Carbine, Cal .30, M1	35
Carbine, Cal .30, M2	37
Launcher, Grenade, M-7	11
Launcher, Grenade, M-79	3
Machine Gun, Cal .30, Light	2
Mortar, 60 mm	2
Pistol, Cal .45	5
Radio, HT-1	10
Radio, TR-20	1
Rifle, Automatic, Browning	9
Rifle, M-1, Cal .30	38
Rifle, M-D	2

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AUGUST 1965  
MIKE FORCE COMPANY



STATED MISSIONS:

1. Reinforcement to a threatened CIDG area or to a CIDG area under attack.
2. Relief of besieged CIDG force.
3. Temporary replacement for combat ineffective units to allow for effective continuation of tactical operations in the concerned area.
4. Reconnaissance to locate Viet Cong Targets for engagement by the Mike Force or other reaction forces.
5. DZ/LZ selection, marking and securing to infiltrate/exfiltrate other large units.
6. Act as an immediate reaction combat force to destroy Viet Cong targets of opportunity developed by intelligence sources.
7. Capable of reinforcing Apache units on a mission or as-needed basis.
8. Act as a tailored combat force to assist in expansion programs within Corps Tactical Zones by providing security/combat forces during the initial stages of camp development.


\* Strength of 185 personnel included three six-man recon squads (one per rifle platoon).

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Incl 4 of Incl 4

APRIL 1968  
MOBILE STRIKE FORCE COMPANY



STATED MISSIONS:

1. To provide reaction/reinforcement for CIDG camps.
2. Conduct Mobile Guerrilla operations.


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**SECRET**

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PROPOSED ORGANIZATION, MSP COMPANY  
(Effective date, approximately 1 May 1968)



\* Includes 16 filler personnel.

Incl 5 of Incl 4

**SECRET**

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SOURCES

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3. USASF Operations in RVN under the CIDG Program 1961-1964 (U), Research Analysis corporations, April 1966.
4. Interview of Colonel Scherer, Director Counterinsurgency Office Okinawa; conducted by 4th Military History Detachment, date unknown.
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6. Records and briefing notes of principal staff sections (S3, S4, S5, COMPT), HQ 5th SFGA.
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8. Records of principal staff sections, Vietnamese Special Forces High Command.
9. Informal interviews of USASF personnel.

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